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INTRODUCTION
The present essay is an attempt to compare Jacques Rancière’s political thinking 
with anarchism by aiming to reach a better understanding of the French author. 
Although I presented the principal question as “Is Rancière anarchist?”, the answer 
cannot be given as a plain “yes” or “no”. Therefore, the question has to be altered for 
the benefit of accuracy, bearing in mind that there will be some similarities and 
differences between Rancière and anarchism. A more proper question would be, 
therefore: “To what extent, or in which sense is Rancière anarchist?”. The result of this 
paper is that they coincide depending on the issue at hand. Since anarchism is a vast, 
and sometimes contradictory ideology, Rancière will agree with a certain anarchist 
regarding a certain issue.
Both Rancière and anarchism are egalitarians in the sense that they  both focus on 
equality. Egalitarianism is a very  broad trend of thought that  gathers different groups 
and perspectives within it. For instance, Rancière claims that equality is neither a value, 
nor a goal, but a presupposition, a point of departure. Anarchism, on the other hand, is 
very broad as well, and different anarchists comprehend equality in different ways, 
lacking any unified conception of it. However, as I conceive anarchism in this paper, it 
is characterised by its scepticism towards authority, putting the discussion on the table 
and without having any pre-determined conclusion beforehand. Although the 
conclusions are diverse depending on different anarchist  authors, regarding the different 
kinds of authority, the claim for equality remains in the background. 
What both anarchism and Rancière have in common, besides the importance of 
equality, is that they  deal with empowerment. They both attempt to give voice to those 
who have none. This issue is precisely what makes them so interesting and appealing in 
times of crisis, like the economic crisis that most Western societies are suffering 
nowadays. Although anarchism is centuries old as an ideology, it is not an exaggeration 
to claim that it is as valid as the newest social criticism. Moreover, it has historically 
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been proved that its popularity increases in times of crisis, like in the Spanish Civil War, 
and the issue today is also taking on a new topicality. 
Rancière, on the other hand, is a French philosopher whose Marxist beginnings 
ended by showing deep differences with both Marxism and his professor Louis 
Althusser. Besides his deep political thinking, which this essay attempts to analyse, 
Rancière is a thinker who offers a philosophical system. His main areas are politics and 
aesthetics, although he also presents original ideas regarding pedagogy. I call this a 
system because the ideas are so interrelated, that it  is hard to limit an explanation to 
only one area of study. In the case of this paper, I work mainly on his political thought 
but also his pedagogy, although sometimes it is hard to limit where politics ends and 
where pedagogy starts. 
 The first chapter of this dissertation will trace Rancière’s political thinking. 
Beginning with the concept of equality as the kernel of his theory; the lack of arkhê or 
lack of foundation for the ruler to rule will appear fundamental for the politics to 
happen. For Rancière understand and uses the words politics, police and the political in 
a different  way, I will then attempt to explain them and their relationship with the 
concept of le partage du sensible. The subject of the political action, the demos, is a 
controversial issue, which I will attempt to explain. Besides, I will oppose my view to 
Todd May’s on Rancière’s demos. Next, the process of creating a new identity during 
the political moment, which Rancière calls subjectivation, will be analysed and its 
relevance for emancipation, explained. After that, Rancière’s view on the political 
philosophers will be examined: Plato with archipolitics, Aristotle with parapolitics, 
Marx with metapolitics, and it current model “postdemocracy” or consensus democracy. 
At last, I make a comment about Rancière’s writing style, trying to grasp the intention 
behind it, which I think is political. 
The second chapter concentrates on anarchism. Starting with the controversies of 
its definition, I will define it regarding its attitude towards authority. Therefore, I will 
also explain what authority  is and the different forms it  takes. Next, I will mention some 
of the anarchist authors and the historical development of the anarchist ideology. At last, 
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I will examine the different kind of protest that  anarchist may  adopt to fight for their 
cause, as well as the debate that the use of violence rises among different anarchist 
authors. 
The last  chapter compares Rancière with anarchism, based on everything that has 
been explained in the two former chapters. I will start by highlighting their common 
origin by mentioning some characteristics of the Enlightenment that both Rancière and 
most of the anarchist fulfil, such as the idea of perfectibility  and the key role reason 
plays in their theories. Then I will assess to what extent Rancière agrees with the 
anarchist characteristic, drawing upon what according to my view, his attitude towards 
the different kinds of authority  described in the chapter two are. After that, a special 
mention will be made to Todd May, for his is the first if not the only  one comparing 
Rancière with anarchism. I will approach his view critically explaining why I disagree 
with his analysis. Finally, a practical example of what anarcho-rancièrian politics 
would be will be presented, based on the group Anonymous. 
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1. RANCIÈRE’S POLITICAL THINKING
1.1 On Equality
The very core of Rancière’s theory is equality and inequality, making it  the major 
problem of the political philosophy1. Equality is not a goal, nor a value, nor something 
that needs to be accomplished, but a presupposition, a departure point. Rancière made 
his Joseph Jacotot’s statement that everybody can be equally intelligent2. So, equality  is 
used as a method to discover where    equality  leads us3. It is important to notice that 
Rancière does not claim that we are all equal, but that we can be equal and it is by 
showing there is equality there is politics.
As a French intellectual of the XXth century, it is not surprising that Rancière has 
a marxist background -it is well known that he published the book Lire le capital with 
his professor Louis Althusser. Although he has kept the “leftist” essence, he has 
dissociated himself from some of the marxist ideas and has shown very critical opinions 
towards some of the marxist theoreticians such as his ex-professor Althusser or the 
sociologist Bourdieu. 
One of the main differences between Rancière’s thought and Marxism -and 
consequently Hegelianism- is the role of history and the temporality  of politics. 
Ranciere rejects any configuration of politics in metaphysical terms. However, it would 
be a very  big misunderstanding to presuppose that history  plays no role in Rancière’s 
thought, quite the opposite: the years that he spent in the archives collecting writings 
from XIX. century  worker’s, shows that history might have something to teach us, 
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1 Kristin Ross., “Historicing Untimeliness” in Jacques Rancière. History, Politics, Aesthetics, ed.  Gabriel 
Rockhill and Philip Watts, (Durham and London: Continuum, 2009), 17.
2 Jacques Ranciere, The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five lessons in Intellectual Emancipation, trans. Kristin 
Ross (Stanford: Standford University Press, 1991), 73.
3 Solange M. Guenoun, “Jacques Rancière’s Ethical Turn and the Thinking of Discontents”, in Jacques 
Rancière, 177.
especially broadening our field of perception, and reconfiguring what is plausible in 
terms of thinking. In this sense, history plays the same role as fiction in the French 
author’s theory, and as we shall see later, history and logos get involved with myth and 
stories when founding the arkhé of the community. So, history has its importance, but it 
does not enjoy  any higher status or especial place as in the Marxism. Time seems not to 
be lineal or dialectical any more; a certain period of time is not a unified voice or a 
unique way of thinking. Even though one period stands over the rest, this is a mixture of 
different ways of thinking and approaches that belong to different periods and live 
together.4  
Rancière also denies, not only a teleology for the community -opposing himself to 
the Aristotelian philosophy- but also any essence of the community, clashing with the 
view that philosophical tradition has defended until very recently. As some of his 
French contemporaries, Rancière belongs to the theoretical position called post-
foundational, the position that rejects any  final ground of the social and sees the 
necessity of arguing about the need of it  -differentiating them from the anti-
foundationalist5. At this point, two main questions that constitute the kernel of his 
theory  arise: the lack of foundational principle -arkhé- of a community and the criticism 
of the intellectual and political philosophers who have tried to find or justify that 
principle. 
Concerning the first  point Rancière, as other post-fundationalists, claims that  the 
principle of governability  is precisely based on the lack of any  principle that justifies the 
power of the better over the worse, the wiser -or professor- over the ignorant, and the 
rich over the poor. Thus, the legitimisation for the ruler to rule over the others has no 
ground, no arkhè, no beginning.  “Democracy is the specific situation in which it is the 
absence of entitlement that entitles one to exercise the arkhè. It  is the commencement 
without commencement, a form of rule (commendement) that does not command. In this 
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4 “The temporality of politics is not progressive, nor dialectical -a word he uses rarely-, it is not 
continuous and it is not over. Politics is an event that cannot be predicted any more than its end can be 
apocalyptically announced. It is always circumstantial, local, and entirely contained in its singular 
manifestations.” Ross, Jacques Rancière, 29. 
5 Oliver Marchart,  “The Second Return of the Political: Democracy and the Syllogism of Equality”, in 
Reading Rancière, Ed. Paul Bowman and Richard Stamp (London: Continuum, 2011), 129.
logic the specificity  of the arkhè (...) is destroyed”6. Note the play with the words 
commencement and commandment, the author is also explaining the two meanings that 
arkhé provides. On one hand it entails a sense of temporality, a beginning in time and 
the disposition of the ruler and the ruled to act in that way, which is proved by its 
empirical operation7. On the other hand arkhé refers precisely  to the distribution of 
these roles, and therefore, the distribution of power. The very impossibility  of the arkhé, 
he calls the wrong8.
Rancièrian democracy means to break with the “natural” order or hierarchy and to 
become aware of the fact that the distribution of roles in society are arbitrary9 and that 
power has neither foundation nor legitimacy. Rancière explains how Plato10 made a list 
of the titles that allowed people to govern in Athens, six of them referring to the 
government of the better, healthier, wiser. etc. Yet, the seventh title was the “favour of 
heaven and fortune”, meaning that it  was the absence of any title, and making explicit 
the contingency  of the ruler. This kind of government without title refers to a 
democratic government. However, democracy  for Rancière, it is not a form of 
government, neither an institution. Democracy is a space where the political subjects 
can interrupt the “normal” order of the things. Democracy  means dissensus; there is no 
democracy  without disagreement. A democratic action is carried out by those who do 
not count; those who cannot be seen in the community and; those who have no name 
but demos.
The concept of the demos is very appealing because unlike the reference to the 
ancient Greece, Rancière’s demos is not a specific subject but any political subject. The 
demos is the surplus of the community, the one which does not count. The whole 
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6  Jacques Ranciére, “Ten thesis on politics”, in Dissensus. On Politics and Aesthetics, trans. Steven 
Corcoran, (London: Continuum, 2010), 31. 
7 Jacques Rancière, “Does Democracy Mean Something?”, in Dissensus, 51
8 Jacques Rancière, Disagreeement, trans. Julie Rose, (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press,  1998), 
13.
9  Marchart defends contingency instead of arbitrariness. See “The Second Return of the Political”, 
129-147.
10 Plato, The laws, Book III, 650c. in Jacques Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, trans. Steven Corcoran, 
(London: Verso, 2006), 39-40. 
constitutes itself, instead of collecting existing parts11. It is precisely bringing this 
surplus to our sphere of perception what doing politics is for Rancière. Therefore, 
democracy  does not mean the government of the majority, the poorer or the lower 
class12  but it refers to any democratic actor who, without having any qualification, 
claims the legitimation (as any other qualified person) to exercise power. So, it can be 
said that the void of the term makes it impossible to identify  it  with any definite group 
or subject, opening the possibility for anybody  to become a political actor: “a 
community  is political when it authorises forms of subjectivization for the uncounted, 
for those unaccounted for. This needn’t imply  a visible category which identifies itself 
as “the excluded” and which wants to identify the community with itself.13” Besides, the 
lack of fixed identity of the demos allows it to be in a strategic position that is used in a 
certain moment to break the given order by  the exercise of the power that, in principle, 
was not given to them.  
The origin of the division of the parts in a community  can be found in le partage 
du sensible14. Although this concept can be found in Foucault, Rancière provides it with 
another meaning: “the aspect of Foucault’s thinking that I have been able to turn into 
my own is that which first asks itself how such a thought is thinkable and who can think 
it.”15  What he is referring to is “to the most basic system of categorisation through 
which we perceive and intuitively  classify the data provided to our senses.”16  In other 
words, le partage de sensible is the given order not in terms of rules but in terms of 
perception; what we acknowledge and ignore; what we hear as noise or speech, or what 
makes something possible to think about, i.e. from the belief that the king has a holly 
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11  Jacques Rancière, “Politics and Aesthetics: an Interview”, Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical 
Humanities. 8:2, (August 2003):198, accessed June 12, 2012, doi: http://dx.doi.org/
10.1080/0969725032000162657,
12 Rancière, Dissensus, 53. 
13 Rancière, “Politics and Aesthetics: an Interview”, Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities 198. 
14  Different authors use different words such as “division”, “distribution” or “partition” to translate 
partage. In order to avoid highlighting some parts of the concept in detriment of others,  I will use the 
original term le partage du sensible, making an especial emphasis on the fact that partager in French 
means to divide and to share. 
15  Jacques Rancière,  “Against and Ebbing Tide: An Interview with Jacques Rancière”, in Reading 
Rancière, 246. 
16 Yves, Citton,“Political Agency and the Ambivalence of the Sensible” in Jacques Rancière, 120.
legitimation to the thought -and action- of his decapitation. Le partage du sensible is not 
something fixed, it is changeable and it is this fluctuation of perception and thinking 
reflected in speech what interests Rancière. 
1.2 On the Police, Politics and the Political
Rancière calls the logic of distribution according to the qualifications, 
competences and places the police [la police]17. He again changed the meaning from 
that offered by Foucault  who originally used the term, so that it  refers not to the 
institutions of power who control bodies and life any more, but  to le partage de 
sensible, insofar it becomes possible to define strategies and techniques of power18. It is 
important to notice that “police” is at the same time the community  without a void and 
without surplus, where everything and everybody occupies the place it corresponds, and 
the practice of the government and the ruling of the institutions are practiced19. It is 
concerning this second meaning that Rancière denies that there are good and bad police, 
rather, there are some police orders that make the irruption of politics more plausible. 
Police is not a levelling mechanism; not all police orders are the same.
Politics [la politique], is what breaks the given order of the community, blurring 
its defined limits and identities. Because it operates with the logic of equality, it is 
necessarily opposed to the police, due to its hierarchy and specificity of its positions. 
Politics is what alters le partage du sensible, what makes the measurable community 
immeasurable and brings what was invisible to the sphere of visibility; makes the 
silence audible; the noise understandable; and plausible what it  used to be unthinkable. 
Politics is the process that starts when the excluded show their equality by speaking. 
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17  Although it might seem so, the police order does not only mean what we commonly understand as 
politics but it leaves room for more content. The compositon of this extra-content is open to debate. See 
Marchart, “The Second Return of the Political”, 129-147.
18 Jacques Rancière, “Biopolitics of Politics?” in Dissensus, 94.
19  Samuel Chambers, “The Thinking of Dissensus: The Politics of the Police: From Neoliberalism to 
Anarchism and Back to Democracy”,  in Reading Rancière,  24, enumerated in four points the 
characteristics of the police but I think that they can be summed up in this main two points that are taken 
from Rancière himself in “Against an Ebbing Tide” in Reading Rancière, 249.
While politics works with equality, which is the sole universal axiom that it can 
have20, police wrongs it: “instead of arguing that the police denies equality, I shall say 
that the police wrongs equality, and I shall take the political to be the place where the 
verification of equality is obliged to turn into the handling of a wrong”21. It is in the 
sense that police and politics are necessarily  opposed because their logics are 
antagonistic, but not in a Manichean way; police being the bad and politics the good 22 . 
They  do not even belong to different worlds or fields23, due to the fact that politics has 
no proper place and always occurs within the police: “The police count is made on the 
basis of distinct spheres, but politics is a process, not  a sphere”24. To both logics 
meeting each other, Rancière calls the political [le politique]. 
So long as politics modifies the perception field, it can be said that it  (politics) is 
always aesthetic because rather than the content, it is the form by which is carried out 
what matters, the form of equality. “Politics is aesthetics in principle”25. They both 
break with the way we think and see and create new ways of dividing the sensible. 
According to Rancière, these two regimes have no proper ontology, they do not  exist 
per se and they only exist through definite regimes of identification26. Although the 
relationship  between politics and aesthetics has been long discussed, it can be said that 
what they have in common is not only the ground for encounter between the political 
subjectivization and a police distribution, it is also the fact that they are a distribution 
and at the same time, a potential redistribution of the sensible27. In that sense, education 
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20 Rancière, “The Thinking of Dissensus: Politics and Aesthetics”, 4.
21  Jacques Rancière,  “Politics, Identification and Sujbectivization “,  October, Vol. 61, The Identity in 
Question (Summer, 1992): 58-64. 
22 Although May and Marchart think the opposite. See Chambers, “The Thinking of Dissensus”.
23 May argues that the police and politics are not only two different logics but also two different worlds, 
the one of the domination and the one that presupposes equality. Thus, May reaches the wrong conclusion 
that the police should dissapear. See Chambers, “The Thinking of Dissensus”. 
24 Jacques Rancière, “Who is the Subject of the Rigths of Man?” in Dissensus, 70.
25 Rancière, “Does Democracy Mean Something?”, 58. 
26 Jacques Rancière, “Afterword”, in Jacques Ranciére, 283. 
27  Gabriel Rockhill, “The Politics of Aesthetics: Political History and the Hermeneutics of Art”, in 
Jacques Rancière, 202. 
can also be understood as politics since “the distribution of knowledge is only  socially 
efficacious to the extent that it is also a (re)distribution of position.”28
1.3 On the demos
But, “Who is behind the demos?” one may  ask again. How should we conceive 
that emergent subject? Is it a group  that is already excluded and claims to have voice? 
Or is it a group that is created by the modification of the partage du sensible, a new 
group that is identified in the “we” or “the people” of the speech? What, at first sight, 
might seem a superfluous question, can have important consequences when we  apply 
Rancière’s theory to real cases29. May explains a case of a black community who 
organised themselves, after a white person killed a member of that community, running 
over him30. According to May, the black community who raised its voice against the 
oppression of the institutions is an example of a Rancièrian political action carried out 
by a demos. May also mentions other examples of the demos, such as women and the 
zapatistas in Mexico. He knows this group exists in the police order, but not as political 
subject.  
However, I have serious concerns about the understanding of the demos in this 
way. In my view, it is not the same to be invisible, to be forced to be invisible. Women, 
black and zapatistas do not have voice, not because they are not seen as a group that can 
be political, but because there are other people who do not want them to take part in 
politics (putting it  in a simplistic way, men, white and rich). We have to take into 
account that, what is at stake is not  only the raise of the oppressed, but also the 
modification of the partage du sensible. Can we alter the way we think and see, using 
the same names for the same groups as in the police? Maybe we can, although the 
identities would remain fixed and that hindered somehow the process of changing our 
way of thinking. Is it, then, a name that is already in the police, but that gathers different 
subjects within it? In that case, the queer movement would be an example of the 
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28 Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, trans. Steven Corcoran (London: Verso, 2006), 68. 
29 I would like to thank Todd May for the interesting discussion we had by email about this topic. 
30 Todd May, “Rancière in South Carolina”, in Jacques Ranciére, 105-119.
Rancièrian political action, for it blurs the boundaries of gender. So, the revolutionary 
act would not be when the group of women, in an act of demonstrating equality, say 
“We, the women”, but when the people from the gay-lesbian-transexual movement say 
“We, the women”, meaning something different to the police order. 
To express it in other words, what we are considering when discussing the demos, 
is  what a political action is and is not, as Rancière understands it. As I have tried to 
show, this is a very problematic issue. Thus, I will attempt to clarify it a bit with the 
help of practical examples. 
The protests and the mobilisations against the shortcuts in Southern-European 
countries have been numerous, but the one I would like to mention is the one that 
happened in Spain and is know as the movement of the “indignados” or indignant. The 
reason why I think it was a political action as Rancière understands it is based in two 
reasons: first, under the adjective “indignant” many and varied people gathered together 
to protest, but they were mainly academically  very well prepared young people who are 
unemployed or with bad work conditions, without possibility  of buying a house, and 
have a very uncertain future regarding pensions. They are the modern excluded, the 
ones that (surprisingly) do not count. The other significant group were the retired people 
who went, not only  to give support to the younger generation, but also to defend their 
pensions, with which sometimes they  can hardly  meet the ends. Thus, calling them all 
“indignant” was, perhaps, a way of grasping the changed categories of reality, because 
who was the political subject in that case? It  was the unemployed young, it was the 
middle-age woman who have been evicted, it  was the elderly  retired man who has 
difficulties paying the bills; they were all economically and politically excluded people, 
the ones who suffered the consequences not only of the crisis but the insensibility of the 
politicians. And they took the “Plaza del Sol” square to show they had something to say 
about it, that they were equal to politicians in the discourse (logos). The other reason to 
take the protests as an example of demos is based in how the police reacted. Here the 
police refer to both uses of the word, but especially to the established order and 
institutions. People in charge of the establishment tried not to take into account what the 
citizens had to say. The official message was that they were just careless youngsters 
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worried about drugs and drinking, all they wanted was the disorder and that they had 
nothing to say about politics because they were not capable, all they made was noise 
(phone). 
Rancière, in the beginning of his book Dis-agreement, mentions a distinction 
between phone and logos. Phone is the sound or noise that animals articulate when they 
are in pain; logos expresses the pain due to the injustice through human language, i.e. 
speech. This is the main difference between animals and humans according to Aristotle, 
and this is how each one sees her position according to Rancière: while the political 
subject claims that the protest is a reasonable disagreement, the police reacts saying that 
the noise they are making is just noise, there is no speech or message there, there is 
nothing that can be heard. “[Politics is ] not a discussion between speaking people who 
would confront their interests and values. It is a conflict about who speaks and who 
does not speak, about what has to be heard as the voice of pain and what has to be heard 
as an argument of justice.”31
Therefore, when the police have to face a dissension from the official logic, it is 
expected that they  call it  “noise”. My suggestion here is that they sometimes even call it 
“terrorism”. From this, we are lead to the following question: can terrorism be political 
in a Rancièrian way? I will attempt to answer to this controversial question later, when I 
go through the Rancière’s idea of post-democracy and consensus. 
1.4 On Emancipation
So we have the police, politics, and the political which are central concepts in 
Rancière’s political thought and are linked to the emancipation that happens through 
subjectivization. When politics occurs, it happens by challenging the given identities 
within the police. When the demos refers to the “we” -the political subject is always 
plural in Rancière’s thinking32 - that “we” is refusing its given place and role in the 
12
31 Jacques Ranciére, “The thinking of Dissensus: Politics and Aesthetics”, 2.
32  “Les sans-parts are always to be conjugated in the plural withing Rancière’s grammar: the stage is 
constituted only after they have managed to speak as a group”. Citton, “Political Agency and the 
Ambivalence of the Sensible”, 131.  
police and it  is creating a new identity. It  is a new collective subject that reconfigures le 
partage du sensible. It can be said that, if the police is about right names, politics is 
about wrong names33. Once again, although the concept was used by  Foucault, 
Rancière’s use of the term changes its meaning in a way that subjectivization means the 
emergence of political actors by  people engaged in the activity  itself, in opposition to 
Foucault’s subjectivization that happens to the object of particular political processes34. 
As Rancière himself explains, subjectivization is a process of “disidentification or 
declassification”35  and its logic is the one of the heterology, what is the formation of a 
self in relation to another36; it is a creation of a new area of experience. 
Besides blurring identities, subjectivization also means combining different fields 
that are supposed to be separated. Politics means to mix the social with the political and 
Rancière insists that there is nothing more proper to politics than the interval between 
the identity and the no-identity. From this follows that he also denounces the arendtian 
division between the social and the political, and its echo in the call of some French 
politicians of the 80s to go back to politics37. As an example, Rancière mentions 
Olympe de Gouges, the woman who wrote the “Declaration of the Rights of women and 
Citizen” as an example of blurring spheres between the social -private- and the political: 
“Woman has the right to go to the scaffold; she should equally have the right to go to 
the Assembly”38. Here it  the paradox of the women during the French Revolution is 
succinctly  explained: if their heads could be cut for political reasons, they should also 
have the right to talk about issues of public interests, they should have the right to be 
heard as people who can give political speeches. But equality, as rights, is nor given 
neither claimed; it is practiced, it is verified39. The struggle by cases of subjectivization 
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33 Rancière, “Politics, Identification and Subjectivization”, 61. 
34 May, “Rancière in South Carolina”, 114-115. 
35 Rancière, “Politics, Identification and Subjetivization”, p.61. 
36 Idem. 
37 Rancière, “The Thinking of Dissensus: Politics and Aesthetics”, 3.
38 Olympe de Gouges in “Article 10 of her Declaration of the Righs of Women and Citizen” in Hatred of 
Democracy, 301. 
39 Ranciére, The Ignorant Schoolmaster, 71.
and the practice of equality  that opposes the privatisation of the common life is called 
the democratic process in Rancière’s theory40. “Democracy, then, far from being the 
form of life of individuals dedicated to their private happiness, is the process of struggle 
against this privatisation, the process of enlarging the public sphere, i.e. fighting against 
the distribution of public and private that secures the double domination of the oligarchy 
in the state and the society.”41  However, for Rancière, social movements do not 
necessarily have to be political, it depends on the modification of the sensible. In order 
to illustrate more what he means, he gives an example of a students protest in France in 
1986, when the government tried to approve a legislation, which by means of “selective 
orientation” would guide students to develop their skill to match them with the 
economic requirement, and in this way, would decrease the unemployment rate among 
higher educates students.  What Rancière highlights is not the fact that students 
protested against this law but the way they did it: “the students brought [the proposed 
legislation], read it and discussed it the students evaluated the law and pronounced it a 
bad law.”42  Instead of organising riots or noisy  protests against the law, the students, 
acted as if they  were capable of judging politicians’ work as good or bad. In doing this, 
the students proved their equality in pronouncing their reasons against the legislation, 
with the same capacity as those who made the law. The students showed that they had 
something to say about public affairs, rather than leaving it only  on the hands of those 
who are officially recognised to make such decisions.
Rancière calls the action of standing against the police order and constructing a 
space that was not there before emancipation, by means of the proof of equality given 
simultaneously  to oneself and to the others. Some authors have defended that Rancière 
has contributed to the ethics of recognition,43  stating that Rancière has in common the 
Hegelian desire for recognition, which is based on the ontological equality of the master 
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and the servant44. Although this ontological equality  is the kernel of Rancière’s theory, 
his way of understanding emancipation does not fall in the theory of recognition, due to 
the fact that it runs, not  only in the direction of the other, but also in the direction of the 
self. Were the case the demonstration only for oneself, then it would be identity  of 
politics, which entails the risk of becoming politics of self-centeredness45. So, the two 
direction message that Rancière’s conception of emancipation suggests gets rid off the 
two dangers that involve committing only to one of the directions. 
For Rancière, democracy is the political articulation of emancipation46. However, 
it has to be emphasised that, following Jacotot’s thoughts on equal intelligence, only 
individuals from a community  can emancipate, society can never be emancipated47. 
There are two reasons for that: first, a community of equals can never become an “equal 
society” because society  intrinsically implies an order and a hierarchy. Rancière draws a 
distinction between community and society: while the first can stand a principle based 
on equality, it is a contradiction to seek for an equal society. Taking into account the 
arbitrariness of society (its roles in the hierarchy), in-egalitarian logic of the social 
bonds is also compared to another arbitrary human construction, although egalitarian: 
the language. The second reason is that a collective subject can never be rational since 
only individuals are provided with reason. The mass cannot be reasonable; in contrast, 
emancipation is supposed to happen by intellectual means and, therefore, a society 
cannot be emancipated. 
1.5 On Philosophers
Rancière is reluctant to label himself as political philosopher stems from the fact 
that all those intellectuals deny equality as the base of the community and see hierarchy, 
even intellectual, necessary not only to preserve the order but also to justify  their role as 
intellectuals. They  think that “the teaching situation rests on the absolute condition of 
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an inequality between a knowledge and a non-knowledge”48, also defending that only 
people who know themselves, can change the situation. Consequently, Rancière clearly 
rejects the theoretical authority, that  is, the intellectuals. What these intellectuals should 
not do, according to Rancière, is “speak for” the excluded, e.g. the workers, but what 
they  should do is listen to people’s voice and help them being heard, without 
interpreting their words or discourses, without putting themselves above people. 
Rancière also opposes the idea of a spontaneous authority, rejecting the idea that 
people cannot make any revolution without an intellectual leader; quite the contrary 
anyone can become a political actor and lead a democratic action. Rancière’s reluctancy 
for the subject of speech to be in the first person singular, “I”, avoids, not only any 
leadership of the revolutionary  moment, but also its perpetuation. As he states “[The 
guarantee of permanent democracy] is the continual renewal of the actors and of the 
forms of their actions, the ever-open possibility or the fresh emergence of this fleeting 
subject.”49
Rancière presents a very interesting paradox about democracy, explaining that 
democracy  has two enemies: the government without limits (i.e. tyranny, dictatorship 
and totalitarianism) and the democratic life, the excess of the individuals that it is 
opposed to the well-ordered government. So, the good democracy  -and the only  good 
one- is the one who will suppress this democratic life-style. Political philosophers have 
tried to eliminate politics through philosophy because that way they thought they were 
contributing to the to the unity  of politics and the self of the community and, 
consequently, eliminating the difference between police and politics. He also calls this 
suppression the “archaic art of politics”50, explaining that the person who tries to 
diminish the political through politics if the Auctoritas. Rancière claims that the 
grounds of the Auctoritas is auctor, to which he opposes the intellectual. The difference 
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between these two is that the auctor uses the words in a way that augments the power of 
the collective being. 
Although the fact Rancière never says explicitly  if these philosophers are right or 
wrong might be a bit  disrupting 51, the content of his writings shows without doubts his 
opposition to the theories of the political philosophers who, being in essence auctors but 
appearing to be intellectuals, try to make the political (disagreement) disappear 
including it in the visible (police). He summarises the content of the discourse of the 
political philosophers in the following two points: “first, equality  is not  democracy, and 
second, justice is not management of wrong.”52  Rancière’s attempt is to show the 
opposite of these two utterances, i.e. that equality or the lack of foundation of the power 
is the very  essence of democracy, and that  justice is related to the process of 
subjectivization to handle the wrong, a wrong which means denying the presupposition 
of equality and dividing the sensible in a fixed, ordered way. There are three great 
figures of political philosophers with their respective regimes are Plato with 
archipolitics, Aristotle with parapolitics and Marx with metapolitics. 
Plato, as opposed to the democratic life as he was, tried to build up a regime 
(politeia) that would avoid all the excess of the demos by including it in the instituted 
forms and the mechanisms that regulate it. The politeia is where the wiser command 
over the ignorant. The supreme sage, i.e. the philosopher, becomes king and rules justly 
and righteously after he discovered what the good, beautiful and just is. Besides the 
philosopher-king, archipolitics is where everybody has a certain place and a certain 
virtue (sôfrosunê) for that place, a regime where a void has no place by unifying nomos 
with physis, meaning that the law and the will of the community  are combined together. 
In order for everybody  have her place and be fixed in it, education plays a fundamental 
role. It is thanks to the education that citizens of the politeia learn to which level of the 
social hierarchy they belong to and why it is appropriate for them.  
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Rancière draws a distinctive line between democracy and republic. Basically, the 
republic is opposed to the democratic process of mixing the public with the private. 
According to the French thinker, sociology and republicanism play the same role and 
that is to “restore beyond the democratic rupture a political order that is homogeneous 
to the mode of life of a society”53. A republic is about correlating the society and the 
state, the democratic excess with the institutions and laws. What Plato defended in his 
political theory, Rancière criticises in the contemporary France. According to him, the 
French republic (also called so for other reasons) tries to unify  the democratic spirit 
with the institutions by education (like Plato suggested), which plays a very important 
role to achieve that goal. 
Although Aristotle endeavours to eliminate politics with what Rancière calls 
parapolitics, he does not  substitute physis by nomos, but the opposite: he overlaps them. 
He wants to create a regime that will be “the one that contained in itself a principe of 
regulating or moderating conflicts, an optimal combination of freedom and stability”54. 
Not only that: this regime has to keep in balance the recognition of equality  and the 
government of the best.
Marx, with his ideology, reveals the falsity, illusion or simulacrum of politics 
since the truth (and the wrong) are outside the realm of politics. Ideology has played an 
important role within marxism and its intellectuals such as the French sociologist 
Bourdieu, who Rancière criticises. Bourdieu presents the argument of ideology as a 
tautology that says that the proletariat “are where they  are because they don’t know why 
they  are where they  are. And they don’t know why they are where they are because they 
are where they are.”55  Rancière argues against this reasoning claiming that the place the 
proletariat -or the excluded, the ones that do not count- occupy  is not related to their 
ignorance but to the expectations: they are expected to be in that place and fulfil their 
role instead of taking part where they have no part. That is why  they  are where they are 
and, as a consequence, what they do not need is an explanation from an intellectual 
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about their situation so that they can change it. What they need is to be seen or heard 
when they cross the boundary of that what delimitates their identity.  This sheds light on 
Rancière’s interest in the workers of the XIX. century, which he found in the archives. 
Those proletariat who were trying to describe their lives and their reality, did not only 
describe it, they also created it. Rancière takes their notes and, without interpreting 
them, helps them be understood as political actors by altering the category  they 
belonged to. Their writings and speeches are examples of subjectivization that their 
contemporary marxist authors could not see.  
As May summarises these are the three regimes and their different tactics to 
eradicate politics: 
“Archipolitics allots unequal places for each in the name of the 
common good; parapolitics blunts the force of the assumption 
of equality by seeking to create an order that requires 
compromising it; metapolitics abandons the field of political 
struggle for equality  altogether in the name of a non-political 
element. But they converge on the point of ensuring that the part 
that has no part continues to have no part”56.
Although Rancière criticises political philosophy, he admits a mission to 
philosophy, stating that its most confidential duty  might be to deal with fear and hate 
that are shown in forms of racism and xenophobia. The French author claims that the 
cause of these problems stem from the failure of emancipation as intersubjectivity  and 
from consensus that denies and erases the void within society. He also calls the 
consensus in democracy  “postdemocracy”. If we understand that, it follows, according 
to Rancière, that  there cannot be democracy  without disagreement, and consensus is 
precisely what  does not allow that disagreement, what avoids any  conflict. The plurality 
of different  voices are converted into a sole voice, there is no place for the invisible to 
be seen since everything is seen, everybody is included, even the excluded. The danger 
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of eliminating the dispute about the wrong and the miscount of people, is the 
inacceptance of and, in the last term, the criminalisation of everybody who presents the 
relationship  between the things in the world and their names in another way. The sole 
consideration of an alternative relationship, meaning another understanding of the 
common, might be very hardly  punished by those ruling. “Consensus, before becoming 
the reasonable virtue of individuals and groups who agree to discuss their problems and 
build up  their interests, is a determined regime of the perceptible, a particular mode of 
visibility  of right and arkhé of the community.”57  What differentiates consensus from 
the former regimes mentioned above, is that consensus follows economic interests, and 
places everybody in the society  according to its economic role, as well as the 
management of the fear and insecurity as we shall see later. 
Oddly enough, another contemporary philosopher uses the same word, consensus, 
as a requirement for his normative discussion. This philosopher is Habermas and his 
theory  is called “Discourse Ethics”. According to him, if we establish rational 
conditions to a dialogue, the result  of that communicative act, will not only be rational, 
but also universally moral. Consensus is the condition for dialogue, which means that 
the participants are taking part  in it voluntarily  and it is an agreement free of coercion. 
Besides their dissimilarity  regarding the starting point for a dialogue (consensus for 
Habermas; equality  for Rancière), there are more differences between the two authors: 
first, while Habermas’ participants recognise each other as such, in Rancière’s theory  it 
is this recognition from one part what is at stake. “Against Habermas’ idealised view, 
which takes the possibility of dialogue and understanding for granted at the 
transcendental level”58, Rancière insists that, at this very level, the object of dialogue is 
nothing but  the very  possibility of dialogue, since some of the partners are not 
recognised as valid speakers by the others. The other distinction is that  in Rancière’s 
theory, the performer does not necessarily  say “I” and “you”, like it should according to 
Habermas, but also “they” or “the workers”. Besides the political subject being always 
plural, as we have mentioned earlier, it is not necessarily in the first person, but it can 
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also be in the third to create a new political subject, even if it  is referring to “the 
people”.  
Contrary  to how Rancière understands democracy, this is nowadays identified 
with a legitimate state. With identifying the law with the spirit of the community59, this 
state just eliminates the wrong. The French author also refuses elections as democratic 
actions because everything is agreed and fixed, it is unanimous in its essence. However, 
in the rancièrian democracy, i.e. the political process of subjectivization by those who 
are not entitled to rule, democracy  itself is at stake and equality is the disagreement 
about equality 60. By avoiding any  space for dissensus, democracy is eradicated by those 
who claim to defend it61.
Now, I would like to go back to the question that I raised before: can terrorism be 
a political act in the way Rancière understands it? First of all, we will have to define 
what terrorism means. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, terrorism is “the 
unofficial or unauthorised use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political 
aims”62. I would also like to emphasise that it is usually  the state and the official 
discourse that labels somebody terrorist, or in the case that it is a group, a terrorist 
group. It is the police who attempts to persuade people, not only to ignore the possible 
political message, but also who tries to fill them with fear. This way Rancière refers to 
the marginal parties that in 2002 in the French presidential elections, when he realised 
that the central role of the debate was the management of insecurity and how marginal 
parties exploit it, following the logic of the consensus: “On one hand, these parties 
foment feelings of insecurity, which the state then turns to its own advantage. On the 
other, the consensual state paints these marginal parties themselves as an additional 
form of insecurity. Consequently, these marginal parties end up  working against 
themselves, helping to promote today’s sacred “democratic” unions of consensual 
government, who are thus handed the means to push through their policies of social 
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consensus -that is, of the soft liquidation of the forms of protection and social solidarity-
which tomorrow will hand them the means to manage the consensus of fear”63. 
One of the problems for the reader when dealing with Rancière’s texts is the 
confusion that his use of the terms might cause. One might ask oneself: if he is giving 
them another meaning, if he uses them in a way that words such as “democracy” are not 
alike our common use, why he does not use other words or create new ones in order to 
avoid all the possible misunderstandings and confusion? What is obvious is that 
Rancière is doing this on purpose, there is no possibility  here to be accidental; his 
thorough writing does not let room for the chance to play any role64.  Why  then, does he 
do so? Rancière uses these homonym words, not to defend their original meaning and 
stand for purity  as some philosophers do, but to take advantage of their homonymy by 
thinking about the intervals that it creates as a way of altering the partition of the 
sensible: “the other way considers that every homonymy arranges a space of thought 
and of action, and that the problem is therefore neither to eliminate the prestige of the 
homonymy, nor to take names back to a radical indetermination, but  to deploy the 
intervals which put the homonymy at work.”65  He breaks with the paradigmatic 
meaning of the concept and goes beyond them, making writing -and reading- a political 
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act: “In my terms, writing -and its other side, reading- is a redistribution of the sensible. 
Writing frees words from a given relation between signs and bodies”66. So the politics 
he claims starts from his texts, from the way they are written that invites to broaden the 
perception horizon of thoughts and at the same time avoiding any  dogmatic 
interpretation of his texts. There lays his undeniable talent67. 
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2. ANARCHISM
2.1 What is Anarchism?
Anarchism is a problematic ideology in many ways: it is problematic in definition 
(there are different opinions about what anarchism is); it is problematic in its canon 
(there are some authors known as “classical”, but the exclusion/inclusion of some is 
controversial); it is problematic in schools of thought (there are so many  different of 
them, some intertwined with socialism, others with liberalism and a lot among them that 
it blurs the boundaries). Consequently, anarchism is a problematic topic to approach, but 
that question has not been an obstacle for philosophers and/or activists to get interested 
in it. 
Anarchism has been largely discussed since its bases were founded; nevertheless, 
a lot of false myths and misconceptions have survived giving place to many prejudices. 
Therefore, before focusing in what anarchism is, it  is necessary to clarify what is not. 
This prejudices can be classified in four groups: the classical, the contemporary, the 
Marxist, and the academic. 
The classical prejudice relates anarchism with violence such as bombs and killing 
people, this prejudice comes from politicians. Although this nihilistic approach is not 
completely mistaken in the sense that  the destructive or negative part plays an 
prominent role within anarchism -and especially for some anarchists-, anarchism also an 
attempt to build a new and better society. Destruction is seen -by  some anarchists- as a 
necessary  means before restarting building a society again. Against the popular belief, 
anarchists do not defend chaos and reject any order, but what they reject is this 
stablished order: the current institutions, the hierarchical order of the society and its 
authority what they put into question. They also try to offer alternatives and say how a 
fair society should be -and attempt to put it in practice, that is one anarchist 
characteristic. 
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The contemporary  prejudice links anarchism only  with culture and no longer with 
politics. Pop anarchism and anarcho-punk movements were created in England in the 
1970s, with their respective appearance -leather jackets, tattoos, piercings, etc. Although 
it is exceedingly  common to create an “uniform” according to a movement - such as 
group identity and thus identify the “we” and the “others”- there is a danger of 
forgetting the ideas of the movement and just wear the outlook for the sake of it, 
becoming part of the consumerism culture. So, it  is quite common to see in some cities 
people with punk look described here and who are addressed by people -and authorities 
-as anarchists in a pejorative way. What I want to clarify about this prejudice is that, it  is 
not the appearance and, according to that, how society calls someone what makes her 
anarchist. It is essentially  her political commitment, her attempt to change the bases of 
the society radically what characterises an anarchist. 
According to the marxist prejudice, anarchists reject all types of power and 
authority. However, there are some kinds of authority that anarchists usually accept-
although boned to empirical verification- such as parental authority. As we will discuss 
later, anarchists are not in essence anti- authoritarian, but this position comes after long 
considerations. Regarding their attitude towards power, anarchists accept power as a 
source for movement or change -like in revolutionary  moments. What they mainly 
reject is power understood as domination. 
The last prejudice, the academic one, states that anarchists are only interested in 
praxis and have little interest in theory since the world does not change by writing 
books. Although action is a significant part of anarchism, it is also true that action and 
theory  are not exclusive options, and that, as most  anarchists admit, both are required to 
achieve their goal. 
What is anarchism, then? The answer, far from being agreed upon, is rather 
controversial due to the fact that different authors explain it in different  ways. 
McLaughlin, in Anarchism and Authority: A Philosophical Introduction to Classical 
Anarchism, classifies these different definitions in three groups: etymological, anti- 
statist and anti- authoritarian, adding that neither of these definitions is suficient.
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The etymological definition takes literally the meaning of the word an (no) arkhé 
(rule), claiming the absence of any ruler. In spite of the veridical explanation of the 
origins of the word anarchist, the word “no-ruler” is clearly far from being able to 
explain the complexity of the concept itself. The etymology, although true, is not 
enough to understand all the characteristics and implications of the concept. 
According to the anti- authoritarian definition, there is no legitimate authority and, 
therefore, any form of it should be abolished. However, this has to be seen as a 
conclusion rather than a principle according to McLaughlin, claiming that it  is the 
anarchist sceptic attitude what promotes such reflexion. This scepticism towards 
authority and, consequently, towards the state is the “essence” of anarchism and thus, 
we can understand how the third definition of anti-statism is not sufficient  to define 
anarchism. According to the anti-statism definition, a society  without state or 
government is not only possible, but  also desirable. What this definition does not take 
into account is that the state, differentiating it from the government, claims and 
exercises political authority, and it  is as a political authority  that the state put into 
question, not just for the sake of being a state. Anarchists’ aim to discuss the legitimacy 
of the authority of the state and, in case they do not find any ground for it, to claim its 
illegitimacy and the consequent actions.
The definition of anarchism I am going to follow is the one McLaughlin presents. 
What makes it appealing is that, without having anything fixed a priori, this definition 
enables further discussions about the legitimacy of authority. In this way, the main 
characteristic of anarchism is not its clear position against authority or the state, but its 
scepticism regarding their legitimacy. As McLaughlin puts it: “the basic philosophical 
procedure of anarchism is to question or raise doubt about the bases of all authority and 
to challenge those forms of authority that it sees as illegitimate.”68  Anarchists, a priori, 
are not anti- authoritarian -they  usually accept parental authority- and do not seek to 
find the basis of legitimacy: if there is none, so be it. Anarchism puts the bases for a 
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process based on the questioning of what seems illegitimate authority without taking for 
granted what the conclusions will be. 
For a better understanding of anarchism, I am going to compare it with another 
two schools of thought: Marxist socialism and liberalism. The three of them are the 
children of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution insofar the three seek liberty 
and equality, but they do so in different proportion. Therefore, this difference in 
proportion is what separates them into different schools of thought. Liberals claim that 
the most fundamental value is liberty  -understanding private property as a right- and 
they  fight against the restrictions for that freedom. Marxist socialists claim that 
possession should be shared according to the needs of the population; consequently, the 
society should be based on equality. Anarchism has certain issues in common with both, 
but its most distinctive feature is the sceptic attitude mentioned before, and that it takes 
nothing for granted. In the following paragraphs, I am going to analyze the similarities 
and differences between anarchism and the other two ideologies. 
Marxism, with its historical materialism, seeks to be a scientific approach to 
reality, it seeks to explain and predict  the fall of capitalism by the raise of the 
proletarian. When that happens, and the proletariat take control of the state, they do 
accept and approve the proletarian state, consequently  the state collapses because it is 
no longer needed. Anarchism differs from marxism in several points such as first, it 
does not aim to be scientific, but is a moral position. The inner morality  of anarchism 
stems from its necessity to fight  injustice -in the form of domination and exploitation- 
and say how the world should be, or at least how it should not be. Although anarchism 
might share this fight with marxism, the approach and way are different. While marxism 
is a doctrine, meaning that the foundations cannot be challenged, anarchism keeps 
challenging, questioning and putting in doubt its foundations as well as those of the 
society. Unlike marxism, the anarchist method for criticising the society  is not based in 
the inevitability of the historical materialism -history is not determined, but we make it 
with our actions -and, what is more, it  supports the idea of the reality being too complex 
to be explained based only  in one factor -economy, God, sexuality, etc.-. Anarchist 
27
authors think that we need different factors to explain all the human relations and that 
just one factor -even authority- is not enough. 
The second main difference between anarchism and marxism is the disagreement 
concerning the state. Bakunin and Marx personified this discrepancy when they first 
warned about the risk of the proletarian government becoming oppressive. According to 
Bakunin, the state has its own machinery and does not extinguish itself but  keeps 
working for its sake, no matter who is in power He called the risk of the workers 
dominant state “the red bureaucracy”. 
Another difference between these two ideologies is regarding the priority between 
domination and exploitation. Whereas, for marxists the second is prior in the sense that 
solving first economic problems would solve political problems, for the anarchists 
domination should be abolish before exploitation. Nevertheless, in order to explain that 
thoroughly, I have to go back to authority and explicate that it is a form of domination, 
as well as describe in which way domination and exploitation differ. 
2.2 On Authority
Authority  is a form of domination, which means that  authority is a form of power. 
What differences this kind of power from the rest is that it consists only  in human 
power. Here, we have to take into account that when we talk about power, it is in a 
“classical” way or pre-Foucaultian, meaning that power is understood as the ability to 
provoke change69. Authority  is also a relational term, referring to the fact that it affects 
social relations: “Authority is vested in rulers or governors; it is acknowledged by 
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Volume I: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978 the original in 1976), 
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subjects or citizens; it is directed toward definite values or goals.”70 Therefore, authority 
can also be understood as “a form of social power.”71  All types of domination and 
exploitation are forms of social powers, but in different ways: while domination is the 
ability  of a party  to use control over another party, exploitation is more related to 
economy, meaning the profit  that  a party makes at the expenses of the other and with the 
effort of this last one. 
The main difference with liberalism is that, while liberals argue about the limits of 
the state (personal freedom, freedom of speech, etc.), anarchism questions the very 
foundations of the state. Some liberals seek for the least possible participation of the 
state, especially in economic affairs. Although liberals are not  anti-statist, there is a 
school of thought within anarchism which is quite close to them, called libertarianism. 
Note that “libertarian” for centuries meant (social) anarchist but “much more recently 
the word has been appropriated by various American free-market philosophers -David 
Friedman, Robert Nozick, Murray Rothbard and Robert Paul Wolff.”72  What 
differenciates an author like Murray Rothbard from the liberals and makes him 
anarchist is that he claims the elimination of the state in favour of personal freedom in a 
free-marekt.
What anarchism and marxism might have in common and in conflict with 
liberalism, is that they have been misunderstood as utopias. Anarchist authors have an 
ambivalent relationship with the utopia. On one hand, there are the benefits that  utopias 
can bring to anarchism in imagining an alternative to the current society. As Kropotkin 
defended, utopias might help revolutionaries clarifying goals and the means for that. On 
the other hand, anarchists claim that their action is focused in the real society and their 
alternatives are viable. A reason for why they  have been seen as social dreamers can be 
found in the broadly  popular supposition that anarchists have an idealistic view of 
human nature. As Kinna states:
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72 Colin Ward, Anarchism: A very short Introduction, (Oxfrod: Oxford University Press, 2004), 62.
 “Critics often claim that anarchists have an overly optimistic view of human 
nature. Yet Tolstoy’s and Perlma’s critiques of authority do not suggest that  individuals 
are naturally “good”. They  argue that the state has made us artificially “bad”. What is 
the difference? From this perspective the problem of the state is not that it creates social 
conflicts between peoples who otherwise live harmoniously, but that it habitually relies 
on violence to resolve differences between individuals who might otherwise rely on 
reason”.73
 There is a further reason why anarchists reject the idea of the utopia as a goal, 
due to the fact that it would be in opposition with another of their principles: the idea of 
perfectibility74. In the way that utopia means the perfection, the end of the way, the 
absence of any need to improve, perfectibility, on the other hand, is the ability to 
improve not only  itself, but  the society as well; a process that remains opened and does 
not stop growing, contrary to the utopia.
Although liberty is the principle value for liberalism, this does not mean that it  is 
not crucial for the anarchists. Actually, for some anarchists the definition of anarchism 
is its commitment to liberty. The difference between liberalism and anarchism is that, 
while liberals ask about the limits of the state, anarchists ask about the legitimacy of the 
state. Thus, anarchists may arrive to the conclusion of rejecting the state and the laws, 
as a consequence of their deliberation; extreme-liberals might get to the point to leave 
the state with hardly any power, but they will never reject the law. 
Going back to authority  and recalling that it is a form of domination, what makes 
domination become authority? While party A dominates party B, it is necessary that 
party  B recognises party A as authority. In this recognition, there are two features: B 
acknowledges party  A as providing binding and content-independent reasons75. It means 
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75 McLaughlin, Anarchism and Authority, 54.
that it is an order to be fulfilled and that the important thing is who said it (party A, the 
one with the authority) and not what said -there is no room for considerations whether 
the argument is reasonable and whether to accomplished it or not. The binding 
characteristic means that party B has a duty to follow what party A said. Authority  is 
“the right of A to issue directives and the correlative duty of B to follow them.” 76
Most of the authors agree in stating that there are different forms of authority. 
They  especially agree in identifying it to be “in authority” and “an authority”. However, 
I will use McLaughlin’s classification77  for being the most clear one. I will explain the 
different kinds of authority and the reaction of different anarchist authors towards them. 
According to McLaughlin, authority can be classified in practical authority, theoretical 
authority and moral authority. 
Moral authorities claim to know the Truth and, therefore, to have full 
acknowledgement of what the right conduct and how to accomplish a good life. 
Although the religious contexts are the most clear examples, it can also be a 
nonreligious authority like in the totalitarian political regimes. Their directives are 
directly  practical, but it is also a matter of faith, people have to be believe in it. 
Consequently, the most serious crime you can commit according to this type of 
authority is disbelief. Because their authority cannot be founded in reason, the lack of 
faith dismantles their foundation, their Truth and their righteousness. On these grounds 
anarchists reject moral authority, because of its lack of rational justification and absence 
of convincing arguments: “it is illegitimate: not inconceivable, but without moral 
foundation.”78 
The theoretical Authority, also known as “epistemic” authority, is someone who is 
“an authority” in a field or area of knowledge. In this case, the authority is exercised 
over the ignorant (without ignorance there is no such kind of authority). The reactions 
of the anarchists are varied and complex. For instance, Stirner rejects theoretical 
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authority on the grounds that the thoughts that are “given to me” are submissive and 
“alien”. According to McLaughlin79, Bakunin and Godwin recognise the wisdom of the 
wiser men and even appreciate their contribution, but they do not  accept the obligation 
of their reasons. Both, as most of the anarchists, make a distinction between authority 
and “advice”. Godwin considered fruitful mutual communication and understood the 
interaction as a way of consulting, but never as binding. Bakunin gives support to the 
reasons of educated men without accepting knowledge as an authority: “I listen to 
[experts] freely and with all the respect merited by  their intelligence, their character, 
their knowledge, reserving always my incontestable right of criticism and censure”80 . 
However, there are two exceptions in theoretical authority, resulting that they  can be 
legitimate: the authority from the parents and teachers. In both cases, it  is assumed that 
it is best for the child to obey  what they say, not  only because they  have a broader 
experience or knowledge in life, but also because parents and teachers try  to keep 
children’s interests. 
The third form in the classification is the practical authority or the “one in 
authority”, related with conduct or action. McLaughlin suggests many sources for this 
authority: knowledge or competence, God, nature, necessity, tradition, personality, 
human beings, position, psychological factors, and so on, leaving the issue of their 
legitimacy  only to the topic of political authority. Within the practical authority, there 
are many types of authorities but McLaughlin mentions the following ones as the ones 
that can be justified: parental, political, operative, pedagogical, spontaneous and 
economic. 
What differentiates parental authority  from adult  authority and makes it 
justifiable, is that a natural benevolence from the parents to the child to protect her is 
presupposed, but also meaning that this benevolence has to be verified empirically. So, 
neither do anarchists assume that all parents are good, nor do they justify  paternalism 
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(authoritarian parental authority). On this ground, anarchists (or most of them) accept 
parental authority as a legitimate one. 
Pedagogical authority is related to the teacher-student hierarchical relationship 
where the first is suppose to pass on her knowledge by giving lectures. However, the 
educational system arise suspicion among anarchists and non-anarchists in the sense 
that “the teacher’s role in discipline and punishment serves to shape obedient and 
uncritical members of society (law-abiding and patriotic citizens) and churches (the 
faithful) -in other words, adapted people.”81 
The anarchist influence on education might have been larger than in other areas of 
life.82  Arguably, the most famous creator of an anarchist school is Francisco Ferrer, 
which he called “International League for Children’s Rational Education” (Liga 
Internacional para la Educación Racional de la Infancia). Ferrer presented a 
pedagogical model that challenged the contemporary education (were passive students 
are prepared for the job market) for an education for emancipation (where active 
students are treated as an end in themselves). That meant that children enjoyed more 
freedom in the classrooms regarding the program to follow, and to commit themselve 
sto the activities they founded more interesting, without imposition regarding what 
children were suppose to do83. Ferrer based his anarchist school in the ideas of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, Leo Tolstoy, Herbert Spencer, and Peter Kropotking, among others84. 
Godwin, being coherent with his political thinking, and against any national 
school, believed that education should help encourage students to be active, rather than 
passive listeners: “It is our widom to incite men to act  for themselves, not  to retain them 
in a state of perpetual pupillage.”85  He was also very reluctant to trust the teacher and 
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profesors that work for the state, because “the project of a national education ought 
uniformly to be discouraged on account of its obvious alliance with national 
government (...) Government will not fail to employ  [the machinery] to strengthen its 
hand and perpetuate its institution.”86
Making a summary  of the features of the anarchist pedagogy, Armaline describes 
what he finds the main three characteristics: “an approach to truth and knowledge 
production that is humble in nature, the creation of spaces for the deconstruction of 
oppressive systems, practices, and ideologies in favor of horizontal ones, and an 
understanding of everyone as capable of curiosity, learning, teaching and creation.”87 
This characteristics especially  highlight the active participation of the student and the 
absence of authority of the teacher.
Spontaneous authority arises in the case of an emergency  such as an accident or a 
revolution. This kind of authority  usually embodies a leader whose orders are followed 
by the people -recall that to be an authority, in necessarily implies obedience to the 
orders. This can be a acceptable criterion to distinguish real leaders from those “wanting 
to be leaders”, who have no ability to give any binding reasons. 
Concerning the economic authority  -superiority  based on property- anarchists 
reject that private property is a natural right but the consequence of the state and the 
law. It is worth mentioning Proudhon’s words highlighting the contradiction of the 
economic authority  being a natural right: “If property is a natural, absolute, 
imprescriptible, and inalienable right, why, in all ages, has there been so much 
preoccupation with its origin? For this is one of its distinguishing characteristics. The 
origin of a natural right: Good God, whoever inquired into the origin of the rights of 
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liberty, security, and equality?”88  Although some of the parts of the economic authority 
are not linked to political authority, most of it is. 
Perhaps, the most interesting type of authority for anarchists is the political one. 
A state is “a distinct social power that claims, exercises, and is widely recognised as 
ultimate (though, given constitutional restraints, not absolute) authority within a 
territory”89  and “has, or claims to have, an exclusive right to perform acts of 
violence” (or to legislate them, as in the case of individual self-defence, the actions of 
private security  firms and so on)”90. The state violence has been especially discussed 
and some authors have affirmed that violence is the […] real essence of the state, 
developing it in two ways: the internal (by police) and the external (by wars). 
How does the state impose duties on the citizens? Sometimes, the use of violence 
is obvious to achieve the goal, but most of the times it is through authority. According to 
McLaughlin, among  the characteristics of the authority of the state, there are two 
contentious characterisctics that make it permanent and involuntary 91. Permanent means 
that the states endures from the moment the citizen is born to the moment of death, i.e. 
“the state is always there”. Involuntary means that nobody asked the citizen if she 
wanted to be part of it, if she wanted to be a citizen: “the state is there either you want it 
or not”. But this could be taken even further, as McLaughlin asks: “Who chooses the 
authority of the state as such?”92 and the answer is no one. 
What is the anarchists attitude towards the state? It can be summarised in one 
word: hostility. As Miller 93  puts it: “Anarchists make two charges against the state -
they  claim that it has no right  to exist, and they  also claim that it brings a whole series 
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of social evils in its train.” As it has been mentioned at the beginning, anarchists do not 
necessarily think of the natural benevolence of the human being, but that the state is the 
responsible of most of the vices and other negative aspects. Besides, anarchists reject 
the arguments given (twenty according to McLaughlin’s classification) to justify the 
legitimacy  of the authority of the state, claiming that the state has no moral grounds for 
his existence (and doubting whether the state can ever be reasonably justified).
2.3 The History of Anarchism
We have already seen some of the controversial issues concerning the definition 
of anarchism. Now I would like to draw the attention to the discussion about the canon 
of anarchist authors and works. Paul Eltzbacher wrote in 1900 a list of anarchist authors 
that has been taken as a reference, although rarely as definitive. Those authors are 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865), William Godwin (1756-1836), Max Stirner 
(1806-1856), Michael Bakunin (1814-1870), Peter Kropotkin (1842-1921), Benjamin 
Tucker (1854-1939) and Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910)94. 
However, the main controversial issue when trying to make an unified or agreed 
list stems from the definition of the anarchism itself. Some thinkers see anarchism as an 
ideology of a society  without government. Therefore, anarchism can be identified, not 
only in all the Western history, but also in other cultures. “Armed with a broad 
conception of anarchism as a belief in the possibility of society  without government, 
anarchists from Kropotkin to Herbert Read have pointed to everything from ancient 
Chinese philosophy, Zoroastrianism, and early Christian thought as sources of 
anarchism. The father of Taoism, Lao Tzu, the sixteenth-century  essayist Etienne de la 
Boetie, the French encyclopaedist Denis Diderot, the American Transcendentalist David 
Henry Thoreau, Fydor Dostoyevsky  and Oscar Wilde, and political leaders like 
Mohandas Gandhi have all be included in anthologies or histories of anarchism”95. 
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Here, it has to be noted that none of the names recall woman. Has  there not been 
any woman who has contributed to the anarchist ideology? Kinna defends the opposite, 
and she even numerates some women who have given significant support to 
anarchism96 . Those women are Emma Goldman (1869-1940), Louise Michel 
(1830-1905), Lucy Parsons (1853-1942), Charlotte Wilson (1854-1944) and Voltairine 
de Cleyre (1866-1912). Arguably,  Kinna states that their small repercussion can only  be 
explained by the disdain with they have been treated.  
The approach to different schools within anarchism is very problematic and even 
sometimes chaotic. So my method to cover that  area will be based in two sections: in 
the first section, I will go through the historical foundation of anarchism and its 
evolution in time (based on McLaughlin97);  and in the second section, I will analyse 
one of the two main points of conflict among various anarchists: the revolutionary 
methods, especially their concern for violence (based on Kinna98).99
McLaughlin, who includes most of Eltzbacher’s names in his list (and some 
more), analyses three texts as the foundational texts of anarchism. These  texts are 
William Godwin’s Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s 
What is Property? and Max Stirner’s The Ego and Its Own. 
In 1793, Godwin wrote his Enquiry, influenced by  the new air that the French 
Revolution spread around Europe. Departing from his utilitarian principles, Godwin 
arrived to the conclusion of rejecting the government. He found two reasons for that: the 
first is that government is unjust; the second argument is about reason or private 
judgment: “the intervention of authority  in a field proper to reasoning and 
37
96 Ibid, 15.
97 Anarchism and Authority, 117-162.
98 Anarchism, 158-206.
99  I will leave the issue of the economic organisation aside due to many factors: something about it is 
going to be implied when analysing the authors and schools in time and regarding violence, and for not 
being fundamental in my thesis, I do not see the need of investigating it further.
demonstration is always injurious”100. According to Godwin, anarchism would happen 
gradually by cultivating reason “the great instrument of justice”101, not by a violent 
revolution, and in this progress, the path to follow would be the absence of political 
authority, the absence of legal coercion, and the absence of economic inequality. 
Although Godwin wrote the first text with anarchist principles and conclusions, 
he did not refer to himself as an anarchist. Proudhon was the first to call himself 
anarchist (until then to be labelled as anarchist was seen negatively), and was  not 
against the government or political order itself, but against the state or the legitimacy  of 
its authority. As the title of his book shows, he centred his attention in property, because 
“[t]he central principle of bourgeois civilisation is in fact property, since both modern 
inequality and the modern governmental principle are founded upon it  (...) “Is the 
authority of man over a man just?” and “Is political and civil inequality just?” -can only 
be settled by asking a third, fundamental question: “Is property just?” Thus, Proudhon’s 
critique of bourgeois-proprietarian civilisation is ethical in character, a critique from the 
ethical standpoint of justice”102. Nevertheless, what is just cannot be said in advance, 
since it comes after a “rational process of critical inquiry”103. 
Concerning Max Stirner, I am not going to explain his book here, due to his 
complexity and obscurity. I would just mention that he built the bases for individual 
anarchism. 
Bakunin and Kropotkin are two authors who developed anarchism theoretically. 
In the case of Bakunin, he also committed himself to praxis. He explained the anarchist 
philosophy and the critique of authority in three principle points: in terms of its 
generally  irrational foundations (religious and metaphysical); in terms of its relation to 
science; and in terms of its relation to socialism. Regarding authority  and science, as we 
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saw before, Bakunin was not  against theoretical authority,  in fact, he thought it was 
justifiable, but also claimed that theoretical authority could never justify political 
authority. However, concerning political authority, his position was “the lesser of two 
evils”, since he preferred limited government to unlimited government, although both 
are illegitimate and, therefore, undesirable. Regarding the issue of authority and 
socialism, Bakunin dealt  with the relationship between the “authoritarian” socialism or 
state and social freedom. “Bakunin denied that the (hypothetical) achievement of social 
equality  could ever vindicate such social oppression, any more than the (hypothetical) 
achievement of individual freedom could ever vindicate social inequality104”. Therefore, 
“the Bakuninian vision of justice -of the inseparability of liberty and equality  -is 
absolutely irreconcilable with the classical liberal attachment to freedom in itself.”105 
According to McLaughlin, one of the biggest contributions of Bakunin to 
anarchism was that he realised it was not necessary  to follow his own philosophy of 
“the lesser or two evils” in ideology but just the opposite, adding the positive aspects of 
liberalism and socialism to anarchism: “he incorporated key aspects of both traditions as 
well -he understood both the exploitative dimension of liberalism and the oppressive 
dimension of socialism, and was unwilling to justify either in the name of the other.”106
When it comes to classifying social anarchism (what is not individual anarchism), 
the are two main models: first, Anarcho-communism: small scale, with localised 
cooperation; and second, anarcho-syndicalism: large scale, centralised production. 
The founder of the anarcho-communism was Kropotkin, who tried to link 
anarchism to the science of evolution that irrupted in his generation by  the hand of 
Darwin. However, the theory Kropotkin suggested, was not based in competition like 
Darwin’s, but in cooperation. McLaughlin suggests that Kropotkin’s science was 
socialist for the denial of competitiveness in  social and natural evolution107. 
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The anarchist thought which reached the gulf between Kropotkin’s orthodoxy and 
the new philosophy came from hands of an Italian anarchist, Errico Malatesta. With this 
step, he “wishes to set aside the philosophical quest  for “foundations” and to 
concentrate on “pragmatic matters””108, also calling for more action in the society 
instead of just contemplating it109. McLaughlin makes two critiques to Malatesta’s 
contribution: first, “[t]he suspension of philosophical judgment recommended by 
Malatesta leaves anarchism open to the charge of being theoretically  incoherent”. 
Anarchism becomes in an ideology  without focusing in theory any longer, and so the 
internal self consistency of the discourse is endangered, and second “[t]he prioritisation 
of transformative action over critical reflection suggests that anarchism is an anti-
intellectualistic form of activist purism”. We have already seen this impression in the 
prejudices, when we refused the idea that anarchism is pure pragmatism, and it does not 
endorse any philosophy or theory. 
McLaughlin includes Emma Goldman in his list and explains that she linked 
anarchism with radical feminism, creating anarcho-feminism. Because she was a 
witness of the consequences of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, Goldman was very 
critical towards “the tyranny of the crowd over the individual”110. Her major goal was to 
achieve the sovereignty of the individual by  changing our values radically and 
oppressive social relations111. 
The most important contemporary anarchist is Noam Chomsky, although he his 
contribution to anarchist theory  is not large112. Perhaps, the reason for that lies on his 
lack of interest in developing “a general theory of anarchism”113, although he has made 
some contributions regarding social control by  means of mass media, especially  media 
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propaganda. “Chomsky developed a “Propaganda Model” with Edward Herman in 
response to what he regards as a fundamental social problem of our time. He calls this 
“Orwell’s Problem”: the problem of how we possess such limited (social) knowledge 
given such rich evidence (or information)”114. 
Regarding the next anarchist, Bookchin, McLaughlin refers to him as neo-
classical115, because like the classical anarchists, he attempts to develop  an anarchist 
philosophy. However, Bookchin introduces a new dimension that was unknown for the 
nineteenth century anarchists: ecology. He investigates the origin of  the anthropocentric 
beliefs and instrumental practices: “[Bookchin] argues that it is inconceivable that the 
notion of nature’s domination by mankind could have predated the domination of 
human by  fellow human. Thus, the ecological crisis has its ultimate origin in social 
oppression (and its ultimate solution in social transformation)”116. 
Contemporary in time with Bookchin, but considerably far in thought are the post-
modern anarchists or “postanarchists”. Unlike Bookchin who fits his anarchist theory 
within then tradition of the Enlightenment, postanarchists like May and Newman, refuse 
the idea of a human nature. “May and Newman respect anarchism’s insights into the 
ubiquity and diffusion of power -its awareness that social power is not limited to the 
state (as liberalism implies) or capitalism (as socialism implies), and that critique and 
change must be social, not merely  political or economic. However, they deny that an 
anarchist ethic -or a faith in rational progress -can be rooted in human nature, as the 
classical anarchists believed; thus, anarchism must be “environmentalised”, 
“contextualized”, or “relativized”117.  
2.4 On Violence
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There was and still is a lot of controversy  going on about the kind and the amount 
of force to be used, in order to achieve anarchist goals. Kinna classifies the force in 
three categories and the opinion of each philosopher118. Those authors who saw 
violence as unnecessary or unjustified are Proudhon, Tolstoy, Woodcock, Clarck, and 
Ward. In Proudhon’s case, for instance, he did believe in a pacific revolution that would 
triumph over the confusion of the state control by dint  of free contract and the principle 
of association119. 
Among the revolutionaries that thought revolution (but not a pacifist one like 
Proudhon) was likely or necessary we can find Bakunin, Kropotkin, Malatesta, Reclus, 
Makhno, Goldman, Richards, Bookchin, and Zerzan. According to Kinna, Bakunin was 
the anarchist who gave the most idealistic treatment to the revolution, as can be seen in 
the way he described the revolutionaries with “blood in their veins, brains in their 
heads, energy in their hearts”120, and being “spontaneous, uncompromising, passionate, 
anarchic and destructive”121. In opposition to Proudhon, Malatesta stood for a 
destructive revolution as he wrote “[w]e are revolutionaries because we believe that 
only the revolution, the violent revolution, can solve the social question”122. 
These authors’ admiration for revolutionary action, specifically propaganda by the 
deed, is described in Kinna’s book as one of the revolutionary strategies. Another 
strategy, also supported by Bakunin, is the general strike strategy. According to the 
Russian anarchists, the general strike is a way  to teach the proletarian masses the origin 
of their oppression, but in a way of learning theory through experience: “emancipation 
through practical action”123. However, this strategy is not without dangers: “it collapses 
either into reformism or into armed struggle”124. Another revolutionary strategy  is the 
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guerrilla warfare such as the Zapatista movement in Chiapas, Mexico. However, it rises 
many doubts whether the guerrilla strategy is totally anarchist, since the leader tends to 
obtain some authority (like the subcomandante Marcos). 
When the hope for change by means of an action is small, instead of revolution 
Kinna calls it protest125. However, it offers many benefits, such as to mobilise the 
people against authority and make them aware of its repressive nature. It  also enriches 
the anarchists movement by providing it  with different ways of acting. The forms of 
protest that are mentioned by Kinna are constitutional action (using the laws to protest, 
like accusing a company of exploitation, for example); symbolic action (it clusters from 
action focusing from building solidarity to more aggressive and violent actions); direct 
action (defined by to characteristics: without intermediator and directed to succeed, not 
just gain publicity); and civil disobedience, which I am going to explain a bit more. 
Although civil disobedience is similar to direct action, the essential characteristics are 
that it is always a non-violent action and that the repression of that action is part of their 
strategy. It is a popular form of protest among anarchist and non-anarchist. The activists 
that are usually  associated to civil disobedience are Thoreau, Tolstoy, Ghandi and 
Martin Luther King, the first  accepting the use of violence, and the other three rejecting 
it. Their followers believe that anarcho-pacifism is the tool to overthrow the state, 
though the discussion between them and the ones who believe in the effectiveness of 
violent action has not been resolved. 
In the last category of the violence, terrorism, there are authors who justified it 
such as Reclus, Malatesta, Richards, and Zerzan, while others like Kropotkin, Tolstoy, 
Goldman, Bookchin, Clark, Woodcock, and Ward thought it  was immoral or ineffective. 
Kinna explains that, for anarchists, justifying terrorism is more complicated than 
explaining it. Following the discussion about the Black Bloc, Kinna concludes that the 
critics for their destruction of private property  are moral and pragmatic126. According to 
the moral criticism, “[t]heir desire to commit violence is an indication of their urge to 
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dominate and oppress”127. The pragmatic side has three parts: the first claims the 
superficiality of the participants throwing cocktail Molotov's and being more worried 
about the violence for the sake of it, rather than useful revolutionary  tactics; the second 
claims that violence feeds repression; and the third is related to the benefit that 
authorities can make from exploiting the commitment to violence (usually  claiming to 
be the victims). Anarchist responses to these criticisms can be resumed as violence 
being necessary, and that it has a purpose, especially in the anarchist transformation. In 
regards to the explanation, the main argument is concerning the good intentions of the 
individuals committing violence. However, Kinna claims that the kernel of this 
explanation is an idea of responsibility and private judgement128  and that taking 
responsibility is not the same as committing to violence. She ends up saying “however, 
if violence is considered to be purposeful - as activists in the Black Bloc contend -the 
responsibility suggests that the question anarchists should ask themselves is not whether 
they  should be prepared to use aggression against the state or civilisation, but how and 
when they should do so”129.
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3. IS RANCIÈRE ANARCHIST?
3.1 Rancière and the Enlightenment
The first similarity between Rancière and anarchism that I am going to analyse is 
their origin in the Enlightenment. As we already have mentioned, anarchism is based in 
the principles and ideas of the Enlightenment, and so are Rancière’s. One of the most 
influential ideas of the Enlightenment was the concept of perfectibility. Perfectibility 
implies natural capacity for the human being to improve, not only himself, but also his 
environment through a process of learning. Perfectibility includes the cultivation of 
language and reason. This idea of the evolution or improvement is fundamental both for 
anarchists and for Rancière as we will see below. 
Regarding reason, people of the Enlightenment, saw it  as an universal and equal 
capability, despite different cultures, feelings and religions. This reason, that can bring 
the autonomy and/or freedom to the individual, is at least a reason in potentia, and that 
is why education plays a very important role in its development. Although I am going to 
talk more about the similarities between the anarchist pedagogy and the kind of school 
that Rancière suggests later, I would like to emphasise the role that reason -or intellect 
as Rancière calls it- plays in their theories. It is not my intention to go through all the 
anarchist authors we have seen in the second chapter , but I will mention the most 
relevant ones. 
Among anarchists who have given great importance to reason, Godwin probably 
would be the first in the ranking. According to him, the cultivation of reason is essential, 
since it  is  “the great instrument of justice”130. He also calls reason “private judgment”, 
and it is by this instrument that the individual is will reach the conclusion that any type 
of authority  is unjust, because it  interferes with the private judgment. If the person 
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reaches her conclusions by her own means, nobody should impose any other thoughts 
on her. 
In Rancière’s case, the idea of perfectibility is translated to the idea of 
emancipation. It is true that  for Rancière, education is not necessary for emancipation (it 
can happen by the creation of a new identity, as in the process of subjectivization), but it 
does play  an important role as he explains throughout his book The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster. Both perfectibility and emancipation are pointing to the potential of the 
individual, what is not but can be. They are both achieved by  the individual free from 
any imposition and they also imply  a sense of improvement, either concerning oneself 
or the surrounding, which in Rancière’s case, is related to the achievement of dignity: 
“[Jacotot’s] own problem was that of emancipation: that every common person might 
conceive his human dignity, take the measure of his intellectual capacity and decide 
how to use it.”131
Regarding Rancière’s intellect  is universal in the sense that “we all can be equally 
intelligent”. He is suggesting a presupposition to see where it  leads: “Our problem isn’t 
proving that all intelligence is equal. It’s seeing what can be done under that 
presupposition. And for this, it’s enough for us that the opinion be possible -that is, that 
no opposing truth be proved”132. It is by showing this equality  in reason that 
emancipation occurs. Emancipation happens by proving one’s equality, not only  in 
language or discourse, but also in the arena where political decisions are taken. I will go 
deeper into the dis-similarities between the ways of showing equality in the ranciérian 
way and the forms of protest  that anarchists use. But for now, I would like to highlight 
that both authors claim the autonomy of the human reason and criticise any imposition 
over it. 
Before starting with the topic of authority, I would like to examine this question: 
if both Rancière and anarchism com from the same tradition (the Enlightenment), do 
they  share the goals? The answer depends on which author or school of anarchism we 
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take into account. If we take anti-statism as the anarchist goal, I would say that Rancière 
does not share their goal. Rancière does not mention anything against the state or the 
governmental institutions, not even against what he calls the police. What he reinforces 
is the power of the people that is always in tension with those institutions. From this, it 
follows that Rancière might have in common with anarchism the will to improve 
society, although without leading to a final state of justice133. This might suppose the 
end of any similarity between Rancière and anarchism. However, in order to avoid 
jumping to the conclusions too soon, the problem has to be thoroughly examined. 
3.2 Rancière and Authority
The topic of authority  is a big issue. As we saw, although for anarchism can be 
defined as anti-authoritarianism, the definition I preferred was the one of scepticism 
about authority. Oddly enough, Rancière shows all the evidence of being anti-
authoritarian. I am going to examine his attitude towards different forms of authority 
described in the second chapter. 
3.2.1 Rancière and Moral Authority
It is not clear what Rancière thinks about moral authority. He mentions the 
pastoral government134  referring to the opposition between the religious hierarchy  and 
the equality of democracy: “Democratic crime has its origin, then, in the primitive scene 
that consists in forgetting the pastor”135.  Thus, it  seems that Rancière does not support 
the christian hierarchy and refuses the equality they  claim, as can be seen in On the 
Shores of Politics: “The glossary of the Rule of Saint Benedict is exemplary in this 
regard, for it notes but two uses of the adjectives aequalis -the first to evoke the equality 
of the charity dispensed by an abbot to each of those who are entrusted to his care, and 
the second to emphasise the equality  of the duty  of obedience (servitutis militium) 
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incumbent upon all monks”136. The reason for criticising the equality christians 
predicate is because, in the end, “[w]hat they did offer, strictly speaking, was either a 
community  of masters of a community  of slaves”137. However, it has to be noted that 
Rancière is not criticising Christian moral authority, but its equality, which is not the 
same. 
Rancière’s attack on Christian moral authority can be understood from the 
following sentence: “An attack on the law of kinship is above all an attack on the 
sheep’s bond to its father and divine shepherd”138 . If we understand that when he 
mentions “kinship” he is referring to the political hierarchy, to the ruler and the right to 
rule, then we can make the inference that Rancière rejects moral authority so far (and in 
this way) it is related to the political authority. “Instead of `the Voice toward Moses´ we 
are governed by a `dead-man-god´. Though it is only capable of governing by making 
itself into the guarantor of “pretty  pleasures”, capitalising on our great  distress as 
orphans condemned to wander in the empire of the void, meaning equally the reign of 
democracy, of the individual, or of consumption”139. 
3.2.2 Rancière and Political Authority
Regarding Rancière’s conception of political authority, there is much evidence to 
show that Rancière is anti-authoritarian in the political sense, but paradoxically, he is 
not anti-statist. Rancière does not mention anything against the state or the 
governmental institutions, not even against  what he calls the police. Police is neither 
good nor bad; police is the way we classify the world and society by assigning people 
the already known identities, as well as the institutions that govern. Politics is what has 
an effect in both and alters them. Rancière is drawing attention to that moment when the 
power of the people challenges the institutions, but never with the purpose of 
eliminating the latter. The process is more similar to the assimilation: in the beginning 
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the new identity that is created changes, not only  the forms of perceiving, but also the 
way to classify the groups within a society. However, after a while, the new partage du 
sensible transforms into police and the given order, until a new political event, changes 
it. The hope is that  this assimilation will be towards an improvement. According to 
Rancière, the police will never disappear, or at least he does not attempt to negate it.
Saying that, Rancière leaves no space for any justification for the ruler to rule. He 
even mentions Plato and his paradoxical seventh title, the one he coines “the anarchist 
title, the title specific to those who have no more title for governing than they have for 
being governed”140. While most anarchists seem to leave  the possibility for a rational 
justification of the state open (although, according to McLaughlin, anarchists might 
suspect that there is no room for that possibility), Rancière strongly denies any 
legitimacy  and he calls to the attempt to legitimate it wrong. Thus, Rancière would 
agree with those “suspicious” anarchists about the lack of foundation of any political 
authority. Rancière stated explicitly in an interview that “at a fundamental philosophical 
level my position can be called anarchist  stricto sensu since I hold that politics exists 
insofar as the exercise of power does not rest upon any arkhé”141. Nevertheless, my 
view is that Rancière shares more things with anarchism than just the etymological 
origin of the concept, as I am attempting to prove. 
For instance, the way Rancière comprehends democracy and they way some 
anarchists do, might not be that different142. McLaughlin states that “for anarchists, 
meaningful democracy  is not merely ` political´. It might be termed “social democracy”, 
had that  expression not been politically debased by former socialists. Instead, John 
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Dewey’s conception of “democracy as a way of life” fits the anarchist bill”143. So, both 
Rancière and the anarchist would refuse the common idea of democracy  as a way of 
government and adopt the conception of a form of life, always in tension with the 
governing institutions. As Rancière explains, “Democracy is the disruption of such 
power and of the circularity of the arkhé. It is an anarchic principle that must  be 
presupposed for politics to exist at all insofar as it is anarchic it precludes the self-
grounding of politics”144. This leads us to another important relationship between the 
common understanding of democracy, by both Rancière and the anarchist, and the 
foundation of the arkhé/authority. 
Rancière explicates that it is the anarchic principle (although not anarchist), the 
lack of foundation, which is the reason for the politics to exist. Rancière does not share 
the scepticism of the anarchist towards the arkhé and does he question either its moral 
foundation. While for the anarchist (as I described in the second chapter ) the result is 
not determined. Since the beginning, for Rancière it is clear that there is nothing that 
can justify the authority, and he gives no reasons for that lack of justification. Rancière 
focuses more on the results of equality, the consequences of his experiment rather than 
giving arguments to justify his presupposition. For that, he only exposes the premise 
that all intelligence might be equal, for no opposing truth has been proved145. It is 
crucial, however, not to take Rancière’s equality as his arkhé. Equality, for him, is not 
something that is taken for granted, but it has to be continuously verified146, or to put it 
in another way, his principle is not equality  but its supposition147. On the other hand, 
anarchists focus more on the arguments pro and con for the justification of the authority, 
leaving the conception of a better society, although not in a second place, but that 
discussed. Some anarchists assume that  a society without authority will necessarily  be 
better, such as Kropotkin, but they do not usually  go deeper into the details. The reason 
for that might be the fear to be stereotyped as utopian, and as I explained in the second 
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chapter, anarchists show an ambivalent attitude towards utopianism. Contrary  to what 
some author’s think148, in my view Rancière has little relationship with utopianism, not 
because it lacks the aim of the anarchists for a better society, but because, he does not 
go further into what that better society  will look like. He just gives tools for the 
intellectual emancipation and describes some events where it has happened. May 
supports the same view when he states that “the other reason Rancière’s democratic 
politics keeps a certain distance from anarchism is the element of utopianism that creeps 
into anarchist thoughts”149. 
Rancière might also be making a contribution to the anarchist cause if we 
understand it as McLaughlin describes it: “In fact, a minimal result of the entire 
enterprise could be the provocation of a new political idea, something imperfect no 
doubt, but progressive after all”150. In that sense, Rancière gives a proper frame for the 
progression with its police -and le partage du sensible- being modified by political 
actions. However, “progress” is a controversial concept, both for Rancière and for 
anarchists. For the latter, progress can be used as an excuse for oppression: “Bakunin’s 
worry  was that Marx’s scientific theory was exclusively focused on the liberation of the 
urban working class and that the communist revolution would lead to the oppression of 
all other workers in the name of economic progress”151. That is why anarchists are quite 
reluctant to describing their means as “progressive”, or at least  as this is usually 
understood. On this ground, when McLaughlin refers to progression, he is probably 
implying an improvement in morality  of the society by the suppression of inequality, 
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exploitation and authority, and not that much to progress as increase in wealth and 
material comfort152. 
For Rancière, progress is another way of referring to inequality. Thus, there is a 
contradiction regarding progress: 
“a man of progress is a man who moves forward, who goes to 
see, experiments, changes his practice, verifies his knowledge, 
and so on without end. This is the literal definition of the word 
progress. But now a man of progress is something else as well: a 
man whose thinking takes the opinion of progress as its point of 
departure, who erects that opinion to the level of the dominant 
explication of the social order”153.  
Although there is a sense of evolution in Rancière, in terms of emancipating 
individuals and creating new identities by  the demonstration of equality, this evolution 
could hardly  be seen as “progress”. What Rancière rejects is that one group judges 
another as inferior and, thus, establishes an inequality inexistent beforehand. Progress 
for Rancière is the distance of the educated and uneducated men, from those who know 
and do not know -as it is typical in the French author, some of the political problems 
and situations are also shown in the pedagogical realm. However, progress as Rancière 
understands it can also be extrapolated to Bakunin’s words and say  that inequality 
would be to classify  between those who have means for a revolution -the urban working 
class- and the other workers without means for that -the farmers, for instance. 
Although I mentioned that Rancière’s theory implies an evolution, this should not 
be understood as the evolution Kropotkin suggested. According to Kropotkin, the 
natural inclination of the human being is to co-operate and not to compete as Darwin 
attempted to demonstrate. Therefore, evaluation would be based on mutual aid and 
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anarchism promotes this, while the state inhibits it154. Rancière, on the other hand, never 
speaks about natural tendencies and instincts; his theory is very  far from being 
biological. That is why Rancière partly shares the goal of Colin Ward and Paul 
Goodman, when they  attempt to “bring anarchism to everyday life”155.  Rancière shares 
this aim insofar as he tries to awake us to perceive possible political moments, despite 
happening very rarely. However, he does not say that the moment of equality is an 
expression of natural human instincts, but an expression of a possible human condition -
equality. Rancière omits any comment about co-operation, but he does mention that the 
revolutionary moment will always happen in the name of the “we”, never of an “I”. 
I already mentioned in the first chapter that  Rancière rejects the idea of 
spontaneous leader during the political-revolutionary moment. The way Rancière 
proposes for the political claim to happen leaves no room for any spontaneous authority 
among the protesters. He is clearly  not against the spontaneity  of the action as he 
expresses “All those who deafen us with their old refrain about the critique of 
spontaneity and the necessity  of organisation forget precisely that an organisation is 
only political if it’s “spontaneous” in the strict  sense of the word, that  is to say if it 
functions as a continuous origin of an autonomous perception, thought or action”156 . 
Rancière is against any authority that might find an excuse to justify  the authority itself 
during the revolt. The tool he uses for that is the “we”. The reason for this is very 
simple: the demos can never be singular. As Citton expresses it, “les sans-parts are 
always to be conjugated in the plural within Rancière’s grammar: the stage is 
constituted only after they  have managed to speak as a group”157. It is not clear whether 
the rejection of spontaneous authority is Rancière’s actual goal, or it  simply  an 
inevitable result of the demos, but the facts are that, it is not  possible to conceive a 
rancièrian demos constituted by a single individual. The subject of the emancipation is 
the “we”, “they” or “the people”, but always plural and there is no leader: 
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“This miscount [the part of those who have no part] is staged in 
a specific way: the construction of a we. There is political 
agency when there is the construction of a we that splits up the 
community  and the invention of names for that we. I said that 
the demos -or the people- was the generic name of those 
invented subjects, which divide the community, as they 
supplement it. This means that  politics builds the stage of a 
conflict between alternative figures of the people”158. 
Who is the demos for the anarchists? Who is the subject that will make anarchism 
happen? In order to answer this question without falling into mistaken generalisations, it 
is required to take the anarchist authors individually. I am not going to analyse all the 
authors mentioned in the second chapter, I will just pick up Godwin and Kropotkin to 
see the contrast between them. 
Woodcock lumps together all the anarchist  opinion and this is how he summarises 
it: 
“anarchists have tended to welcome as natural rebels the 
declassé elements whom Marx despised most of all because they 
fitted nowhere into his neat pattern of social stratification; as a 
result the anarchist movement has always had its links with that 
shadowy world where rebellion merges into criminality, the 
world of Balzac’s Vautrin and his originals in real life”159.
 Looking at the anarchists more specifically, Kropotkin claimed “not a single 
revolution has originated in parliaments or in any other representative assembly. It all 
began with the people”160. Here it seems that  “the people” is referring those of a lower 
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class, probably  the working class. In opposing the working class to the politicians, it 
appears that Kropotkin was alluding to the first as those who have no voice and have no 
part and, consequently, agreeing with Rancière. However, it might be too ambitious 
from my part to compare them without having enough evidences of Kropotkin’s 
thinking about “the people”. Maybe inspired by Marx, or maybe for other reasons, a lot 
of anarchists have thought that the working class, the proletarians, would make the 
revolution. Nevertheless, it has not always been that way. We have already  seen in 
Chapter Two that Godwin was a liberal anarchist and he did not defend the idea of any 
special group of people more appropriate than others to make anarchism real. According 
to Godwin, anarchism would happen progressively and inevitably insofar as individuals 
start using reason and reach the conclusions by themselves. The private judgment of the 
individuals would promote the absence of political authority, the absence of legal 
coercion and the absence of economic inequality161. 
What is the difference between the anarchist critique of Marxism and Rancière’s 
critique of metapolitics? They both base their criticism on the economic part of 
Marxism. As we have seen in Chapter Two, anarchists criticise that Marxism bases its 
explanation of the reality  on one factor, the economy, and ignore the rest of the factors. 
In this way, the Marxist description of the reality is simplistic for the anarchists and 
does not  reflect all the complexities of human relations. Rancière, on the other hand, 
considers economy as a non-political issue that is used in metapolitics as an excuse to 
suppress the political
3.2.3 Rancière and Pedagogical Authority
Rancière’s view on pedagogy is very similar to the anarchists. They  both see the 
official pedagogical model as restraining children from developing freely  their skills 
and from becoming adults in the future with critical thinking. On this ground, Rancière 
and the anarchists stress in the capacity of the child or student to produce knowledge 
without the need of any imposition, but just the opposite: that the absence of it might 
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motivate and encourage them to learn more. However, they  show different approaches 
regarding the role the adult plays in the educative process. 
In Rancière’s case, he departs from the question “who has the right to think?”162 
and concludes that everybody has that right, the master and the student. The adult plays 
an important role in education, not as an authority, but  as a facilitator of the process. 
Rancière highlights that the facilitator does not need to be any expert in the subject, 
anybody can help the student, making sure she is paying attention and she is building 
her own opinions. The master’s fundamental function is to interrogate and verify 163. 
That gives the chance for anybody who does not know to know, anybody who is not an 
expert to become into an expert through a process of learning based on the use of one’s 
own intellect. 
According to some anarchist authors, there does not have to be any adult to 
facilitate anything. As we saw in chapter two, Godwin was against any national school 
because government will always use its resources to ensure its authority  is not going to 
be challenged. Rancière, for different reasons, does not support a national school 
because only individuals can be emancipated, a nation never will164. “There is only one 
way to emancipate. And no party or government, no army, school or institution, will 
ever emancipate a single person.”165  The reasons for Rancière’s rejection are founded in 
the process of emancipation which is individual, since it can only  happen by the use of 
the reason of the person. 
Bakunin suggested a school where there was not going to be any pedagogical 
authority and were information and knowledge would flow in any direction: 
“They will be schools no longer, they will be popular academies, 
in which neither pupils nor masters will be known, where the 
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people will come freely to get, if they need it, free instruction, 
and in which reich in their own experience, they  will teach in 
turn many things to the professors who shall bring them 
knowledge which they lack. This then will be a mutual 
instruction, an act of intellectual fraternity.”166 
Bakunin, as Rancière, rejects the idea of an education based on the hierarchy of 
the professor over the student where the source of the knowledge is only the one on top. 
Which role is Rancière playing or does he have to play as an intellectual (if any)? 
May explains the dilemma that Rancière has to face: “If Rancière is offering only  a 
description of democratic politics, then it has no normative force, and the critical 
element that it seems to possess is lost. Alternatively, if the framework of his thought is 
not merely descriptive but also normative, as this chapter argues it is, then it undercuts 
the very equality  he endorses”167. The paradox is related to what Rancière wants from 
his audience: to have an influence on them or not. In case he wanted to change his 
readers’ minds, he would be acting as a theoretical authority, executing the inequality he 
has so much criticised, by thinking that he has something to offer (an explanation?) to 
the others who lack of it. However, if he admitted that he has nothing new or different to 
offer, his theory would lose its strength and attractiveness. Perhaps, there is a third way, 
which is to take him as anarchists like Godwin or Bakunin took theoretical authority: by 
considering what Rancière says as a piece of advice. 
3.3 Rancière and Anarchism by Todd May
Todd May is definitely  an author worth analysing for anybody who is 
investigating Rancière and anarchism. He strongly believes that Rancière is anarchist. 
For that, he contrasts the passive equality derived from distributive theories and the 
active equality of the anarchists and Rancière. As Amartya Sen expresses it, the first 
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always implies an equality “of something”168, the equality  that  is given to the citizens 
(Rawls) or the equality that is protected (Nozick). Citizens are seen as objects of 
institutions instead of subjects of politics169. According to May, the kind of equality 
Rancière and anarchists propose is active insofar it implies active participation and it is 
based on creating equality rather than wanting it170. 
May also includes Marxist authors among the authors promoting active equality: 
“[t]here is no contradiction between Marxism and active equality”171 , because “[t]he 
communist revolution can be conceived as an egalitarian struggle of workers to 
appropriate the means of production, a struggle that does not require direction by an 
intellectual class”172. Arguably, the main conclusion that might be reached from this173 
is that May assumes that anarchists reject “the intellectual class” or any intellectual 
leadership. This view agrees with Rancière’s, but it looks like not all the anarchists (or 
at least the ones we have analysed in the Chapter 2) would agree with that statement. As 
we already saw, the refutation of all theoretical authority is controversial for anarchists 
and even more if there is a reference to guiding a revolution. 
Samuel Chambers has compared May and Rancière regarding anarchism. 
Chambers bases his comparison in May’s understanding of the police and politics to 
refuse May’s view on Rancière’s anarchism: 
“Rancière has himself actively  resisted the idea of 
reducing his thoughts to anarchism. More substantively, we can 
show that when Rancière argues, as I quoted above, that politics 
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Political Thought of Jacques Rancière, 4. 
169 May, The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière, 12. 
170 Ibid, 24.
171 Ibid, 79.
172 Idem.
173 Although it might seem I do not have sufficient evidence for these conclusions, I picked up purposely 
some of May’s sentences because they reflect his thought. I am not going futher in proving what May’s 
thoughts are due to the small relevance for my topic. 
will always be “bound up” with police, he continues as follows: 
`the reason for this is simple: politics has no objects or issues of 
its own (1999:31) [...] Politics cannot be uncoupled from police; 
it only appears in this `blended´form.”174
According to Chambers, May  wants to engage in politics by leaving the police 
aside, but in rancièrian terms, that is not possible since they are both bound together.  
Regarding the question of workers as demos, I already mentioned in Chapter One 
that I had some concerns about how May understands it. Yet, May has a more 
controversial view regarding another claim: he defends the notion that Rancière 
supports the surpression of the police. “Anarchism does not demand the changing of 
labels on the layers, it doesn’t want different people on top, it wants us to clamber out 
from underneath”175. May suggests that we “compare this statement with Rancière’s 
position that a democratic politics seeks to undermine police orders, not change or 
modify  them”176. According to Samuel Chambers,  May misreads politics against police 
and, consequently, it has to be supplemented by a misreading of equality as substantive 
ground177. Although I agree with Chambers,  it is not my intention to give detailed 
arguments against May’s position. I am more interested in the consequences of his 
(mis-)understanding of Rancière and the possibilities that it opens. 
May’s (mis-)interpretation of Rancière concerning the demos and the elimination 
of the police gives another interesting perspective about the practicality  of the theory. 
Rancière himself admits that the political action as he understands it happens very 
rarely178  and, besides, the revolutionary  subject  appears to be ambiguous. All these 
characteristics lead to a pessimistic approach towards the practicallity  of his theory and 
leaves small room for the hope, not only to witness a Rancièrian political act, but even 
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to identify one. However, what in Rancière seems subtle (like the political moment), 
May makes it drastic and more visible (like the proletarian revolution). Thus, in my 
view, May is contributing to Rancière’s theory, even though he might not  be too 
orthodox. 
3.4 Forms of Rancièrian Politics
The next question is what form can take the Rancièrian political action in order to 
show the equality  of the people. How much does it fit into the forms of anarchist 
protest? First, it has to be taken into account that Rancière gives a lot of importance to 
the language in the demonstration of equality, because “only an equal understands an 
equal”179. This equality  does not only occur in discourse, but it is the principle of the 
arts. Art  is only  possible under the supposition that it will be understood, so the artist 
assumes that the public is her equal in intelligence, in understanding: “The artist  needs 
equality as the explicator needs inequality.”180  
Due to any other content than equality, the Rancièrian political can take many 
forms, including all the anarchist kinds of protest mentioned in Chapter Two, if they 
fulfil the criteria: to be the demos and to challenge le partage du sensible and, therefore, 
the police order. From this it follows that even terrorism can be political, as the French 
author understands it. 
A practical example might help  illustrating what anarcho-rancièrian politics might 
be. For that, I am going to briefly mention the case of the group Anonymous 181, which 
is labelled as terrorist by some governments and institutions182. The paradigm is the one 
of the internet and the  controversial discussions that involves, such as freedom of 
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information versus censorship and personal freedom versus security. The question is: 
who administrates the space to navigate on the internet? What at  first seemed a free and 
opened area to search exchange information, politicians of some states have attempt to 
restrict its use in the name of security. What  does Anonymous do? Putting it bluntly, 
Anonymous fights against any censorship in the internet, they  focus “on promoting 
access to information, free speech and transparency.”183  They are considered anarchist 
and they presents themselves as “decentralised network of individuals”184, lacking for 
any hierarchy, nor head in the group:
“Finally, to understand the dynamics of power and authority in 
Anonymous one must confront what is one of the most 
interesting, prevalent, and socially-vibrant norms within 
Anonymous: its anti-leader and anti-celebrity ethic. This ethic 
that modulates, even if it does not fully eliminate, the 
concentration of power. Anonymous provides what Mike Wesch 
had described as “a scathing critique of the postmodern cult of 
celebrity, individualism, and identity while serving itself as the 
inverted alternative.”185  It is key to note that participants do not 
only wax philosophical about this commitment; they enact it. 
Participants remind each other with remarkable frequency that 
one should not behave like a leader, nor seek personal attention 
in the media, calling the practice “name fagging” or 
“leaderfagging.”186  If you do 'leaderfag', you most certainly will 
receive a private or public drubbing, and if you have called a lot 
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185 In Press "Anonymous, Anonymity, and the End(s) of Identity and Groups Online: Lessons from “the 
First Internet-Based Superconsciousness" in Human No More, eds. Neil Whitehead and Michael Wesch. 
University of Colorado Press.
186 The terms “fag” and “fagging” are very common on 4chan, the Anonymous networks, and other troll-
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of attention to yourself, then with a mere keystroke, you might 
be instantly banished from IRC.”187
In my view, what Anonymous fight is against the authority  over the disposition of 
the internet.  Corrupted politicians and people in power attempt have no interest in the 
transparency of their business or the measures they take to control people, e.g., social 
control. Therefore, they  have vested interest in restricting the exchange of free 
information in the net, presenting it as a national security issue188. Anonymous, as I see 
it, raises its voice to claim that those who do not count, those who are anonymous, have 
also something to say regarding the limits of the free use of information. They do not 
accept the commands of those in power regarding how internet should be used or what 
should be said; on the contrary, they attempt to show the corruption and the control the 
security forces exercises over citizens. For that, they use different methods, from 
denouncing to hackering the computer systems of the security  forces, always making 
their actions public. 
Anonymous challenges the authority  on the net and, by equal weight among the 
participants, they  come to the visible sphere, making decisions where they were not 
supposed to do so. Anonymous speak for people who cannot speak. 
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188 I would like to clarify I am not against security measures on the internet. My goal is to point at some 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This essay has sought to reach a better understanding of Rancière’s political 
thinking, by  comparing it to the anarchist ideology. Rancière is a relatively new author 
compared to the traditional philosophical authors and, consequently, there is not too 
much secondary material on his thoughts; they have not yet been analysed in depth. 
This is double-edged fact: on the one hand it the interpreter gives more opportunities to 
be enterprising and original, but on the other hand, there are more possibilities for a 
misunderstanding of Rancière’s theory because of the lack of solid grounds for 
discussion. I have hardly had any other material than his works to grasp his thoughts, 
and sometimes their obscurity led me to the uncertainty  of the accurateness of my 
understanding over them, with hardly  any possibility of contrasting them with opinions 
of other authors.
The case of anarchism is the opposite one; it includes many different authors with 
different thinking that  are sometimes contradictory. On this ground, it  is not surprising 
that Rancière has some arguments in common with some anarchists. For instance, 
Rancière’s intellect is very approximate to Godwin’s reason (and how reason was 
understood during the Enlightenment). The similar idea behind those different names is 
the one of potential, what a person can do alone without any imposition over him or his 
mind. 
Concerning authority, Rancière shows to be clearly  an anti-authoritarian. Based on 
the different kinds of authority I have attempted to describe, the most relevant one for 
his thinking is political authority. He strangely  combines a strong anti-authoritarianism 
with an attitude that is not  anti-statist. He also defends a gradual improvement of the 
society by the irruption of the political moment but which is only temporary  and, with 
time, becomes part of the police. With the “excuse” of equality, Rancière dismantles any 
argument for the ruler to rule. The way  he uses the argument of equality seems very 
anarchist in the sense of delegitimising political authority, although for anarchists 
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political authority is always related to the authority  of the state. Related to the political 
or revolutionary moment, there are some similarities between Rancière’s anti-leadership 
theory, and the view of some anarchists, like Woodcock, who describes them as 
“declassé” (without class). Kropotkin visualised a revolution carried out by  the 
“people”, which despite all the ambivalences, could match Rancière’s description of the 
demos. However, the latter is more clear when contrasting it with Godwin, since his 
individual development based on reason is very far from the group action that a demos 
implies. 
Rancière coincides with anarchists regarding the pedagogical model to follow, 
especially in the lack of authority. Rancière agrees with Godwin in the impossibility  of a 
national “rational” school. The  potential of the reason they both see, cannot be 
developed by state institutions, for different reasons for each author. Regarding the 
contrast with Bakunin, while in Rancière’s model there is clearly  an adult who makes 
sure the students are learning, the adults in Bakunin’s model do not have to play  that 
role. Bakunin also stresses the bi-directionality  of information while Rancière’s adult 
does not necessarily have to learn from the experience. 
It is significant how Todd May  has contributed to the discussions on Rancière. 
However, I have attempted to describe the reasons of his (mis-)understanding. I have 
showed my doubts regarding his view on Rancière’s demos, giving arguments against 
his interpretation of the rancièrian politics and the police. 
Finally I have attempted to describe what I consider to be rancèrian politics, 
using a practical example, that of the ciber group Anonymous. By their organisational 
form as well as their actions, they  might illustrate better a connection between Rancière 
and anarchism.
In my  view political philosophers need to offer something to society and Rancière 
does do so. With the current economic crisis, the welfare states are being destroyed in 
some countries and, as a consequence, millions of people are (becoming) impoverished. 
The situation forces them to protest against the institutions and those who have taken 
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the decisions. However, the way  the media (the established order) portraits them is by 
delegitimising those protests. This is a reality  that philosophy  and, especially political 
philosophy, cannot turn a blind eye on this, because before being philosophers, we are 
citizens. Therefore, we need tools to wage against oppression and injustice of what is 
happening. 
Rancière offers a theory where those protests are as legitimate as the established 
order, or as what he calls the police. Put it in other words, those who rule have no 
legitimisation to govern. Rancière presents a theory  where an alternative partition or 
distribution of the sensible (le partage du sensible), an alternative to the way  we think 
or speak is not only necessary but also desirable to avoid the risks of totalitarianism, 
racism and hatred. 
Rancière provides us with a tool that might be even more interesting, not only 
academically, but also regarding practical issues when comparing them to anarchism, 
because of its fighting tradition. On this ground, I will attempt to make a contribution to 
the academic philosophy, but I also wanted it to be relevant for those who seek for help 
in philosophical ideas to fight for a better world. 
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